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Faster  economic growth in Africa involves a recovery  in the
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Broad comparisons show that growth is linked to  Some shifts reduce import dependence. One
imports, but country comparisons over short  is a shift from public consumption to private
periods show the link to be more flexible than  consumption. Another is a depreciation of the
fixed. Countries can adjust import intensities in  real exchange rate. And a third is a shift to agri-
the short term - maintaining growth, even with  cultural growth.
depressed imports.
By contrast, opening the trade regime and
For Africa, in these stringent times, a big  promoting exports would encourage imports
question has been whether better domestic  (and exports). Restructuring industry to increase
policies induce structural changes that also spur  its productivity would also increase some
more growth for each dollar of imports. Put  imports (b-t  reduce others).
differently, Can African countries reduce their
historically high import dependence? Can they  What emerges from this analysis is that
resume growth without substantially increasing  some policy changes and structural adjustments
their imports?  in Africa can change traditional import intensi-
ties. But if African countries are to achieve
One set of policies affecting the import  faster sustained growth, imports will need to
efficiency of growth includes those that improve  increase substantially from the recently de-
the incentives for agriculture and for restructur-  pressed levels. And countries will have to use
ing the manufacturing sector. Another set  those impcrts far more efficiently than in the
includes macroeconomic changes that affect the  past.
real exchange rate and the level and composition
of public spending. Such policy changes have  This paper is a product of the Trade Policy
been under way to varying degrees in several  Division, Country Economics Department.
African countries - among them, Ghana,  Copies are available free from the World Bank,
Kenya, Zaire, Zambia, Nigeria, Tanzania,  1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.
Madagascar, and C6te d'Ivoire.  For copies, please call extension 61679, room
N-8049.
What, then, are some of the policy outcomes
that change the import intensity of growth?
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SOME  CONSIDERATIONS  FOR  AFRICA
I.  OVERVIEW
1.  Assumptions  about  import  growth  provide  an essential  link.  between  GDP
and the balance of payments i.a  medium-term  country frameworks.  Even the
simplest  accounting  frameworks,  such  as the  Bank's  RMSM,  rely  on estimates  of
import  elasticities  to reconcile  GDP  and  balance  of  payments  forecasts. RMSM,
for instance,  utilizes  past GDP-import  relationships  to project  imports  that
would  be consistent  with growth  targets,  and  adjusts  the import  levels  given
external  financing. Country  analyses  of the  import  elastic;  'es,  however,  are
still  limited.  Especially  needed  is a better  una-  nding  of the
determinants  of the GDP-import  relation  and how it is afrecced  by domestic
policy.  Motivated  by this gap, this paper  responds  to the Africa  Region's
request  fo.  a review  of the  import-GDP  relationship  in the  context  of  Africa's
financing constraints.  It focuses on Africa and on selected countries
involving significant  policy  changes:  C6te  d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya,
Madagascar,  Nigeria,  Tanzania,  Zaire  and  Zambia  in the  quantitative  analysis,
as well as Ethiopia  and Zimbabwe  in some  of the  discussion. While  the  paper
concerns  Africa  primarily,  it also examines  broader issues  regarding  import
projections.
2.  Behavioral  models  explaining  imports  use  income  and  price
elasticities  of import  demand  to capture  the effects  of income  ard relative
price changes.  Previous econometric  estimates  of these SM  ante, partial
elasticities  are reviewed in the next section  of the paper.  Econometric
analysis  for  a twenty  year  period  reveals  strong  and  significant  relationships
between income and imports,  with income elasticities  well above one for- 2 -
Africa.  Accounting  frameworks,  on the other  hand, rely on estimates  of the
aggregate import-GDP relation.  Such  ^  gost,  "composite"  elasticities
relating  imports  to income  differ  from the partial income  elasticities  not
only  because  the former  include  pr'.ce  effects  but also  because  they take  into
account  other factors  such as foreign  exchange  constraints  and quantitative
restrictions.  For  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the  availability  of external  assistance
and  foreign  exchange  have  been  especially  binding  in limiting  import  growth  in
recent  years.  Accordingly,  the  composite  elasticity  tends  to exhibit  more
short-term  instability  than the income  elasticity. Short-term  reductions  in
the composite  elasticity,  however,  are found  to be followed  by a catching  up
such  that  there  is significantly  more  stability  in its  long  term  relationship.
Consequently,  the  long-term  import-GDP  ratio  appears  fairly  stable.
3.  Africa's  prospects  for  exports  and the supply  of foreign  savings  in
the  1980s  have implied  considerable  tightness  in import  financing.  A part of
this resource constraint  has been reflected  in depreciations  of the real
exchang rate,  but another  part has meant  a continuation  of foreign  exchange
controls, quantitative restrictions  and import tariffs.  Concomitantly,
imports  are determined  not only  by income  changes  but also  by relative  prices
changes and restrictions.  The  Special Office for African Affairs has
previously  forecasted  ttiat  import  volume  growth  in the coming  years in Sub-
Saharan  Africa  might  be constrained  to about  3  percent  annually. Overall  GDP
has  been  projected  to grow  by about  4 percent  annually. The  implied  composite
elasticity  of less than one was below  past long term estimates  for Africa.
Irndividual  country  forecasts  by country  economists  vary --  but, on the  whole,
the long term projected elasticities  have been well below past long-term
estimates.  The implicit  income  elasticities  in recent  country  projections
seem  to be well below  one  on the  whole  for  the  next ten  years  or so.  If theforeign  exchange  constraint  remains tight,  attention  focuses  upon both the
compressibility  of imports  and the import  requirements  for adjustment  and
growth  --  especially  intermediate  inputs  and raw  materials. Concern  for the
import-GDP  relation  is equally  valid in the event  of a more relaxed  foreign
exchange  outlook.  Attention  in such a scenario  is also directed  towards  the
efficient  use  of imports.
4.  This paper  discusses  factors  that are relevanmt  to making  judgements
about  future  elasticities,  and,  more  broadly,  to  assessing  the  extent  to  which
the  past  can  be used  as a  yardstick for  the future.  The  composite
elasticities  summarize  actual  past behavior,  considering  binding  constraints
(such  as QRs) and flexibility  in importation. The experience  of the past
twenty years contains evidence both on import-GDP relation both under
favorable external conditions (1970s)  as well as otherwise (1980s).  The
flexibility  in the import-GDP  ratio  seems  significant,  at least  in the  short
term, especially  when previously  high import  financing  meant considerable
"fat"  in imports. Where  policy  changes  are  feasible,  this  flexibility  appears
more significant. In such situations,  however,  the  question  deserves  to be
raised  whether  the  elasticity  can continue  to be low  or even lowered  further
in view of the import  compression  and  sustained  income  decline  that have
already  taken place  during the 1980s. It also relates to the  import
requirements  of adjustment,  industrial  restructuring  and growth.  The import
implications  of reorientation  also work in the upward direction,  i.e. when
import  financing  is relatively  relaxed.  Evidence  on import  dependency  and
inefficiency  has implicaticns  for the need for redirection  independently  of
the financing  outlook,  and it therefore  affects .. he composition  of imports
supported.- 4 -
5.  The  key  questions  in this  connection  seem  to  be:
- What are the long- and short-term  import  elasticities  in the
African  experience?
- Are envisagee  . -.put  growth  rates consistent  with the imports
outlook;  to  Wa.  extent  should  the  past  be  used  as  a  guide  to
future  possibilities?
- To what extent  is import  demand  a result  of fixed  coefficients?
How and to what extent is the tlexibility  in the import-GDP
relation  (and exports) affected by  structural and policy
adjustment?  How  much  can  they  be lowered.on  a sustained  basis?
- What are the  aspects  of quality  and  composition  of imports  that
should  support  adjustments  even if the  elasticities  do not  need
to  be lowered  in  view  of  better  export  responses  and  financing?
6.  It should be noted at the outset that this paper does riot  give
conclusive  answers  to these  questions. First,  the  present  discussion  should
be qualified  by reference  to data limitations: for instance,  smuggling  and
mis-statements  of imports  limit  the  adequacy  of the  published  data  used  in the
paper.  It has  been hard to assess  whether  the  bias in report  is systematic,
although  some relationships  (to  exchange  rate changes,  transport,  port and
administrative  improvements,  etc.) can be surmised.  Second,  non-price  and
institutional  dimensions,  which are so important  to Africa,  are beyond the
scope  of this  paper. Quality  of the  infrastructure  seems  to  be a particularly
important  determinant  of the  import-GDP  relation. Other  potentially  important
variables,  not  yet analyzed,  are  urbanization,  the  quality  and composition  of
aid financing,  and  export  prospects. And finally,  although  this  paper  brings
global  estimates  of import  elasticities  to the Regional  and to a selectedcountry-group  level,  it still  remains  aggregative. For  individual  countries,
therefore,  reference  tc the  estimates  in this  paper  could  provide  no more than
a cross-check  to country-specific  judgements. Keeping  this caveat  in mind,
however,  some generalizations  and possible  ways of classifying  countries  in
terms  of  effects  of po'licies  on import  elasticities  are  provided.
7.  Section  II provides  estimates  of partial  and  composite  elasticities,
suggesting  expected  ranges  for  their  values  in  country  work.  Going  behind  the
numbers,  analyses  of how policies  affect  the estimates  are suggested..  Thus
the  rest of  the  paper  is devoted  to selected  structural and policy
considerations  of relevance  in adjustment  in Africa.  One set of factors
itfluencing  the import  i ! isity  of growth  is the structural  composition  of
output,  which  is examined  in Section  III.  The sectoral  output  composition  is
affected  .by  economic  growth  as well as by policy  shifts,  such as the  efforts
to improve  agricultural  incentives  and  to restructure  industry  in Sub-Saharan
Africa.  On the one hand, the steady  decrease  in agricultural  share in GDP
with  growth  raises  the  import  intensity,  whereas reductions of past
distortions  against  agriculture  (and  any  increases  in import-saving  activities
in general) have the opposite effect.  Effects in industry can also be
ambiguous.  Country evidence  points to inefficiency  associated  with past
import dependency and protection in manufactu-7ing,  which would suggest
compressibility  of  imports under  restructuring.  On  the other hand,
rehabilitation  and renewal  of capital can be ;mport-intensive  in specific
cases.  Without  suggesting  any  special effort to shift  the sectoral
composition  or carry out adjustments  on grounds  of import-intensity  per se,
the paper evaluates orders of magnitude of possible import changes from
ongoing  and  proposed  policy  changes.8.  Macroeconomic  policy  changes  affect  imports  (and exports).  Again,
without recommending  any particular  emphasis  in policy for import  reasons,
Section  IV examines  posrible effects  of macroeconomic  adjustments  underway  Ln
Africa.  Import  demand  is dependent  on aggregate  expenditures  which  have come
under  pressure  during  stabilization.  The  extent  to  which  expenditures  --  and
therefore import growth --  can be reduced  while protecting  income  growth
would determine  whether  the import  intensity  of growth (i.e.  the imOport-GDP
ratio)  can  be lowered  compared  to long-term  trends. The levels  and  kinds  of
public  spending  can change  import  intensity,  and  better  public  management  and
increased  capacity  utilization  can improve  import  efficiency. Exchange  rate
depreciation  reduces  import  demand,  while  import  reforms  -- in the  absence  of
such depreciation  --  can have the opposite  effect,  so that tiie  net outcome
depends  on the  relative  sizes  of these  effects. Export  promotion  may lead  to
increased imports, particularly as non-traditional exports are import-
intensive. Furthermore,  what  happens  to the import-GDP  ratio  in response  to
real exchange  rate and other  policies  depends  not only on their  effects  on
imports,  but also on output. The final  part of Section  IV is devoted  to the
analysis  of the  import-GDP  ratio  rather  than  imports. Analysis  of the  import-
GDP  ratio  gets  around  the  difficult  question  whether  GDP  determines  imports  or
whether imports  determine  GDP in the face of foreign  exchange  constraints.
Finally, to the extent that domestic reforms, or autonomous and ongoing
changes, encourage labor-intensive  production,  they could lower import-GDP
ratios.
9.  The paper  provides  preliminary  estimates  of the  orders  of magnitude
of some of these  effects:  additional  empirical  and country-specific  work is
needed to make the results  more operational. It is readily  seen that the
extent  of applicability  of each type of policy  change in affecting  imports-7-
depends  on where  one  starts  and the  degree  of change  implemented. The  needed
redirection  and the commitment  .o  reform  obviously  vary frou _.ase  to case.
Country studies are full of information  on policy weakne-6ses  and needed
changes.  In a summary  study  based  on 1970s'  data,  Agarwala  (1983]  found  the
degree of distortions (and  honce needed redirection)  particularly  high in
Tanzania,  Nigeria  and  Ghana  and  moderate  in Cote d'Ivoire  and  Kenya.  Similar
results  are given in this paper  based on econometric  estimations. Combined
with  country  knowledge  of  how  much  change  is  feasible,  judgments  oi  mdjustment
poss  Dilities and  effects  on imports  should  be made  in  policy  ana.
II.  MEASURES  OF THE IMPORT-GDP  RELATIONSHIP
Partial  vs.  Co2Dosite  Elasticities
10..  World-wide  estimates  point  to  the  possibility  that  income
elasticities  of  import  demand  over  a  long period  of  time would  be
substantially  more than one.  In a recent  study  by Pritchett  (1986)  for 28
developing  countries,  income  elasticities  are significant  and substantially
greater  than one.  The  mean of the 28 country  sample  of income  elasticities
was 1.33. Only  two  countries  have income  elasticities  significantly  less  than
one whereas  12 of the 28 (43  percent)  have income  elasticities  significantly
greater  than  one.  Such  results  seem to also  hold on average  for  a sample  of
15 African  countries  examined. Results  for the eight  African  countries  are
given in Table 9:  the average  value of the income  elasticity  is over 1.
Moran  (1987) obtained OLS  est.  ates of long-term income elasticity for
developing  countries  ranging  from  0.7 to 1.5.  These  estimates,  it is shown,
do  not take  into  account  foreign  exchange  constraints  which  have  the  effect  'of
reducing  the responsiveness  of imports.  Disaggregated  import  elasticities- 8 -
were calculated  by Agbonyitor (1986) for Tanzania, Zaire, Somalia, C6te
d'Ivoire,  and  Sudan:  the  elasticity  for  petroleum  imports  ranged  from  1.4  to
2.9, for investment  imports  from 1 to 2.5 and for intermediate  imports  from
0.8  to  2.1.
11.  CroJi-country  estimations  by Pritchett (.2  cji) also suggest an
inverted  U curve  relating  the  income  elasticity  to per  capita  income,  as will
as a positive  relation  between  this  elasticity  and income  growth. The  poorest
countries  have the smallest  income  elasticities,  although  even for a country
with US$300 per annum per capita  income,  the predicted  elasticity  is 0.9.
Accordingly,  growing  economies,  especially  approaching  middle  income  levels,
can have income  elasticities  exceeding  that of the rest of the world.  In
addition  these  economies  are expected  to grow (at  say  4 percent)  faster  than
the industrial  economies  (say  2-3 percent).  If the implied  differential  in
import  demand  were actually  translated  into  imports,  they  would  mean continued
trade  deficits. While such an outcome  is part of development,  it would be
problematic  depending  on its size and its  possibilities  of capital  flows  to
finance  the  gaps.
12.  Price  elasticities  in Pritchett  (1986)  for developing  countries  are
significant  but less than  unity.  The  average  was -0.57. All but  one of the
six  Sub-Saharan  Africa  countries,  however,  had  price  elasticities  greater  than
one.  The import  demand  elasticities  with respect  to the  exchange  rate  or the
dollar import  price in Table 9 are also,  on average,  more than one.  These
estimates  suggest  significant  responses  of imports  to relative  price  changes.
It might be noted also that these effects  do not always,  and adequately,
separate out the impact of foreign exchange constraints  which are very
important  in the  African  context.- 9  -
13.  The above  estimates  are  based on traditional  OLS models  that  assume
income and relative price changes explain import  behavior.  If, however,
import  financing,  and therefore  import  controls,  are binding constraints  to
imports,  the above  estimates  would  be biased  and inconsistent  for the  usual
simultaneous equation reasons.  The critical role of foreign exchange
constraints  in explaining  import  behavi-r  for developing  countries  was first
studied  by Hemphill  (1974)  and  extended  by Moran  (1987). In the  latter  study,
the external  budget  constraint  as well as relative  prices  and income  explain
imports. Salehi-Isfani  (1985)  used foreign  exchange  reserves  as a proxy  for
quantitative  restrictions,  in addition .o  income  and prices,  to obtain  good
explanations  of import  de" .id  for  Nigeria. Without  specifying  and  estimating
a  complete  model,  instrumental  variables  techniques  are used  by Pritchett  to
recover consistent  estimates  of the income  elasticity.  Correction  of the
simultaneity seems to increase the median income elasticity by over 50
percent. The results  hold for  disaggregated  import  demand  equations  as well.
The  new  estimates  also  strongly suggest that imports and  income are
simultaneously  determined,  and the causality  needs  to be disentangled  to get
better  estimates  of the  underlying  import  demar.d  parameters.
14.  While  the above types of estimates are essential in behavioral
models,  they  are  not  the  composite  elasticities  used in  accounting  frameworks.
The latter  can be computed  from the  Bank's  BESD  data base or the IMF's  WEO.
The  BESD  contains  trade  data  as well as national income statistics.
Elasticities  based on the trade data in the BESD are below the results- 10  -
Figure  1:  IMPORT  VOLUME  AND  REAL  IMPORT  SHARE  IN AFRICA





S  : B.  eal  iOpRgdD  (.)
,,.,.............. .*.  ............................
4  4  70  72  741  76  ;B  90  18  84l  8
Source:  JESD,  IBRD.fable 1: 6DP  6ROUTlI  AND  IIIPII 6RO011  (INCLIOES  6011S  t  NIIN-FACIOR  SERVICES)
1965-73  1974-81  12-k  1965-1l  1965-8
65P  lport  lap/61'  6DP loport  Imp/65P  6Dt  loort  lp/6iP  l6t Imort  lop/6i1  6DP  lport  lap/6iP
LI  6.2  1.3  1.2  5.1  7.3  1.4  3.9  0.1  0.2  5.7  7.3  1.3  5.3  5.8  1.1
Africa  5.3  5.7  1.1  3.2  6.9  2.2  -0.7  -9.6  13.7  4.3  6.3  1.5  3.2  3.2  1.0
Africa  (exci  Nigeria)  4.5  5.2  1.2  3.4  3.3  1.0  0.3  -5.9  -19.7  4.0  4.3  1.1  3.1  2.4  0.3
Asia  6.5  11.1  1.7  5.6  10.8  1.9  6.9  7.0  1.0  6.2  11.0  1.8  6.3  10.1  1.6
ENEIA  6.0  6.9  1.5  5.4  4.7  0.9  2.9  1.7  0.6  5.7  6.9  1.2  5.1  5.7  1.1
Latin  America  6.3  7.9  1.3  5.0  6.6  1.4  1.3  -7.7  -5.9  4.7  7.4  1.6  4.7  4.0  0.9
Sub-Saharan  Africa  5.4  5.6  1.0  3.1  9.3  3.0  -0.3  -10.8  36.0  4.3  7.3  1.7  3.3  3.2  1.0
SSA  (exci  Nigeria)  4.0  4.7  1.2  3.2  3.9  1.2  1.7  -3.9  -2.3  3.7  4.3  1.2  3.2  2.4  0.7
lot  Income  Cos  5.4  1.7  0.3  4.6  6.2  1.3  7.6  9.1  1.2  5.0  3.8  0.9  5.6  5.0  M.9
HLgh  Indebted  Cos  6.3  8.1  1.3  4.9  7.t  1.6  0.9  -8.6  ".  5.1  7.9  1.4  4.6  4.1  0.9
35 SAL  Cos  6.5  8.0  1.4  5.2  7.3  1.4  2.2  -3.1  -1.4  5.9  9.1  1.4  5.1  5.6  1.1
15 NIjor  SAL  Cos  6.4  8.5  1.3  5.9  8.0  1.4  2.3  0.1  0.0  6.2  3.3  1.3  5.3  6.4  1.2
1 Afracan  Cos  6.4  7.2  1.1  2.6  10.3  4.0  -1.6  -14.5  9.1  4.6  8.6  1.9  3.2  3.3  1.0
Remo  Item:
Cote  d  lvoire  7.1  6.7  0.9  6.4  7.6  1.2  -0.7  -2.5  3.6  6.8  7.1  1.0  5.1  4.9  1.0
6hana  2.4  0.1  0.0  -0.5  -2.6  5.6  I.5  -5.0  -3.3  1.1  -1.2  -1.1  1.2  -2.0  -1.7
Kenya  8.5  5.3  0.6  4.8  1.1  0.2  2.9  -1.1  -0.4  6.6  3.3  0.5  5.9  2.3  0.4
Madagascar  2.5  0.8  0.3  0.3  -0.9  -3.0  0.1  -6.5  -9.3  1.5  0.0  0.0  1.3  -1.2  -0.9
Nigeria  7.9  10.2  1.3  3.0  21.5  7.2  -3.1  -21.9  7.1  5.6  15.5  2.3  3.6  7.0  1.9
Tanzania  5.8  8.8  1.5  2.5  7.5  3.3  1.4  2.6  1.9  4.2  3.2  2.0  3.5  6.9  2.0
Zaire  3.8  12.4  3.1  -0.8  -0.1  0.1  0.7  -3.4  -4.9  1.7  6.5  3.3  1.4  4.3  3.1
Zambia  3.6  6.4  1.9  1.6  -5.7  -3.6  -0.6  -3.9  6.5  2.7  0.7  0.3  1.9  -0.4  -0.2
Note:  Data  delinitions see  Annex  Table  2. Data for  Afrlca, 6hana,  and  Nadagascar  is covered  up  to 1985  only.- 12 -
reported  on the basis of WEO (see  Annex Table 1).1  On the other  hand,  the
national  accounts-based  elasticities  are closer  to (though  also below)  the
WEO-based  numbers. For the  present  purposes,  we utilize  the  results  based  on
national  accounts  in  Table  1.  These  are  also  less  problematic  than  trade  data
when imports  are to  be compared  with GDP in the  same  currency. By and large,
the  long-term  composite  estimates  for  developing  countries  are  well  above  one:
1.3 for 1965-81  and 1.1 if the  years 1982-86  are also included. The small,
low-income  countries  are  the  only  group  with  a less-than-one  elasticity,  while
middle-income  countries  (rot  shown  in  the  table)  have  an estimate  of 1.4.  The
estimates  are significantly  higher  during  high growth  periods  and for faster.
growing  country-groups. The post-1982  estimates  are very volatile,  showing
the effects  of sharp  declines  in the growth  of GDP and imports.  There  are
only limited  country  examples  with composite  elasticities  significantly  less
than  one  during  long  periods  of sustained  growth.
Among  the  countries  that  have achieved  a growth  rate of 4 percent  or
more during  1965-81  and 1965-86,  the ones that have had an import
elasticity  of less than one are  Kenya,  Malawi,  Congo,  Pakistan,  Sri
Lanka, Burma, Malta and Guatemala.  It would be interesting  to
examine  the  factors  behind  their  experiences.
LI  The differences  seem to arise mostly from :  (i) the fact that BESD
covers  90 countries  while WEO covers  120; and (ii) the differences  in
price  deflators  used. The  deflators  in  the  BESD's  trade  data  seem  higher
than  those  in  WEO.  We are  accessing  the  WEO data  currently  to  understand
these  variations  better.- 13 -
Flexibility  in the  Imports-GDP  Ratio
15.  The composite elasticity for Africa for the high growth period
1965-81  are above one.  Including  Nigeria,  it is seen that  African imports
grew more than twice  as fast as GDP in the 1970s,  while they  have declined
together  in the 1980s.  The long-term  trend in imports-GDP  appears  flat for
the countries  in question  with the exception  of Ghana  and Zambia  which show
long-ti  'u annual reductions  in imports-GDP  of 0.9 percent and 0.2 percent
respectively;  most other  countries  show  no long-term  trend. In fact,  perioes
of import  reduction  have  been  followed  by periods  of  catching  up.
If the past experience  of a composite  elasticity  of more than one
were to hold during 1982-90 as a whole for Africa, the import
compression  in 1982-86  would  call for  a high and  positive  elasticity
during  1986-90  for  the  same  GDP  growth.
16.  While the import-GDP  ratio is relatively  stable  over longer  time
periods, it has varied significantly  during  shorter time periods.  During
1962-83,  the  coefficient  of  variation  (standard  deviation/mean)  of imports-GDP
for the eight countries  fluctuated  between  20 percent  and 40 percent.  The
accompanying  graph  implies  that  while  over long time  periods,  import-GDP  was
stable,  during  shorter  periods  GDP has not accompanied  import  fluctuations
fully.  The compressibility  in imports  is evident  especially  in  capital  goods
behavior. The fluctuations  of fuel  and capital  goods  imports  explain  a high
proportion of the total import variability.  Sub-periods  of low overall
elasticity  (1968-72)  show  especially  low  estimates  for  capital  goods  and  vice
versa  (1978-82).  The  i965-81 average import composition  for the eight
countries  was  heavily  weighted  towards  capital  goods  (36 percent),- 14  -
intermediates  (31 percent),  and fuels (12  percent),  while finished  consumer
goods  and  food  accounted  for  about  7  percent  and  14  percent  respectively.  The
fact  that  over  75  percent  of the  imports  are intermediates,  fuels,  and  capital
goods  indicates  that  long-term  growth  is  heavily  dependant  on imports  and  that
long-term import-GDP  flexibility  would depend on the flexibility  of the
production  sector  rather  than  of consumer  demand.
Table :  IMPORT  COMPOSITION
Seven  Countries  A/  Eight  Countries
1965-81  1982-86  1965-81  1982-86
Food  12.2  12.1  13.0  14.3
Non-food  6.5  8.0  6.9  6.9
Intermediates  32.9  28.3  33.0  31.3
Fuel  15.4  21.6  9.1  11.7
Capital  Goods  33.0  31.A  38.0  36.1
Total Go',  s  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
a/  Excluding  Nigeria.
Notes: These  shares  are  calculated  at  current  prices.
According  to SITC one-digit  codes,  the above  import  categories  are
defined as follows:  Food - SITC 0  (food  and live animals)  +  1
(beverages  and tobacco)  +  4 (animal  and vegetable  oils and fats).
Non-food  consumer  goods  - SITC  8 (miscellaneous  manufactured  goods)  +
9  (goods  not classified  by kind).  Intermediates  - SITC 2 (crude
materials,  excluding  fuels)  +  5 (chemicals)  +  6 (basic  manufactures).
Fuel - SITC 3 (mineral  fuels).  Capital  goods - SITC 7 (machines,
transport  equipment).
Data sources 1975-83 imports data are taken from UNCTAD tapes,
accessed  through  the TARS software  (World  Bank).  1984-86 imports
data come from  World Bank country  division  files,  CEM's,  RED's,  as
well  as country  statistical  reports,  GDP  data  are  from  the  BESD tapes
(World  Bank).- 15 -
17.  The sectoral  breakdown  in  the  use  of imported  inputs  in  production  is
also  very different. The imported  inputs  (i.e.,  capital  goods,  intermediates
and fuels) to output intensities  of major sectors  were examined  based on
input-output  tables  for  C6te d'Ivoire  (1985),  Kenya (1976),  Madagascar  (1983)
and Zambia (1980).  Agriculture  is the least import-intensive  sector,  with
non-food  manufacturing  being several  times more import-intensive. Broadly
speaking,  agriculture,  mining,  food manufacturing  and services  are the least
import-intensive  and  non-food  manufacturing  and  utilities  the  most.  The 1985
inpu'  -output  matrix for C6te d'Ivoire  contains  disaggregated  data on input
requlrements by  subsistence and  export agriculture.  While subsistence
agriculture  is substantially  less import-intensive  than export  agriculture,
the latter,  often together  with food manufacturing,  is still significantly
less import-intensive  than those  for  value  added  in other  sectors. *Relative
import  intensities  in  agricultural  value  added  are  also  far  less  than  the  rest
of the economy  (Table  3).  However,  these  coefficients  should  be interpreted
cautiously  mainly because they do not reflect indirect imports.  If the
indirect  imports  are taken  into account  it is likely  that the import-output
ratio  in  mining,  and  perhaps  agriculture,  would  increase. Nonetheless,  given
the  fact  that  the  agricultural  sector  almost  everywhere  in  Africa  uses  capital
and  manufactured  intermediate  inputs  in very limited  accounts,  as other  data
sources also suggest, agriculture  would remain substantially  less import-
intensive  than  manufacturing.  It  may  appear  surprising  that  services  are  more
import-intensive  than agriculture  and in some countries  even more intensive
than food manufacturing.  The reason is that services  happen to include
transportation,  a highly  import-intensive  sector.  If transportation  were to
be attached  to the  productive  sector  with  which it is closely  complementary,
the import-intensity of all  sectors would be higher than that of non-
transportation  services.- 16  -




Ca2ital Imnort  of Intermediate
Intensity:  Inputs Intensity in
Share of Agriculture  Rest of Economy/  Rest of Economy/
Country  in Total Value Added  Agriculture  Agriculture
C6te d'Ivoire  0.29  27.8  7.9
Ghana  0.54  18.1  24.3
Kenya  0.29  9.3  2.2
Nigeria  0.30  16.7  28.2
Tanzania  0.45  20.2  11.4
Zaire  0.31  5A.0  51.8
Zambia  0.15  4.4  .81
Source:  Value added in agriculture and GDP are extracted from BESD.
Table 4:  PROJECTED GDP AND IMPORT GROWTH RATES
1986-90  1991-95
GDP  Imports  Imports/GDP  GDP  Imports  Imports/GDP
Ghana  5.0  8.1  1.6  4.0  3.2  0.8
C6te d'Ivoire  2.7  4.0.  1.5  5.0  5.1  1.0
Kenya  5.1  2.4  0.5  5.1  4.8  0.9
Madagascar  3.3  4.2  1.3  3.8  3.8  1.0
Nigeria  1.6  -8.5  -5.3  4.5  6.4  1.4
Tanzania  3.8  4.4  1.2  4.2  2.9  0.7
Zaire  3.3  1.6  0.5  4.1  2.8  0.7
Zambia  2.9  5.3  1.8  4.1  3.3  0.8
Source:  Preliminary projections  by country economists, January 1988.- 17 -
Past  Experience  vs.  Future  Outlook
18.  The 1965-81  weighted  average  elasticity  for  the eight  countries  was
2.0, and 1.3 if Nigeria  were excluded.  The Region's  country  projections
available to us seem implicitly  to recognize, to some extent,  both the
flexibility  in imports-GDP  and  the  limits  to such flexibility  over long  time
periods.  In some country  cases,  the  acute  import  reduction  in the  1980s  is
enviaaged  to be followed  by elasticities  that are  at least  as high as long-
term  trends  --  in  other  country  cases,  however,  this  is  not  so.
The weighted  average-of  the elasticities  in country  projections  --
0.3 for 1986-95  and 0.9 if Nigeria  were excluded  -- are lower  than
long-term  historic  trends  and  much less  than  what  would  be needed  to
permit  the  catching  up mentioned  earlier. This issue  of the  import-
GDP consistency  should,  however,  be reviewed  in light of changing
structures and policy, and it will remain  pertinent  even if the
import  financing  picture  improves.
19.  The extent  to  which the  future  can  be different  from the  past might
depend  on a number  of factors.  The question  of "excesses"  in past imports
associated  with aid financing  was already  mentioned.  If reduction  of past
disincentives  to agriculture  and  complementary  policies  mean  extended  relative
growth  in agricultural  production,  this could  imply  a lower  import-GDP  ratio
than  otherwise. Industrial  restructuring  would  imply  changed,  if  not  lowered,
import  needs. The role  of the  public  sector  can  also  influence  import  levels,
since  the  levels  and  kinds  of  public  spending  are  not  neutral  in their  import
implications.  Better  public  sector  management  could also lead to greater
import efficiency.  Trade reforms  can affect import-GDP  ratio in opposite- 18 -
directions. On the  one hand,  it can lower  the  import  demand  by shifting  the
composition  of cutput  towards  sectors  that  are less  import  intensive  and that
have suffered negative protection (especially  agriculture).  Also, trade
reforms may contribute  to lowering  the overall capital-labor  ratio of the
economy,  since industry  that has been protected  is likely  to be relatively
more capital-intensive  and more dependent  on imported  intermediates. This
latter  effect  is reinforced  if trade  reform  is  combined  with  domestic  reforms
oriented  to permitting  a more efficient  operation  of the labor  and capital
markets.  From a situation  of an overvalued  domestic  currency  and a high
fiscal  deficit,  movements  towards  a  better  equilibrium  might  lower  the  import
demand  and the  import-GDP  ratio. (These,  however,  may  be one-time  changes  and
not  necessarily  continuous  reductions).  On the  other  hand,  the  direct  effects
of trade  reform  on imports  is  positive  to the  extent  that  they  reduce  import
restrictions.  Export  promotion  often  requires  making  available  imported  (and
domestic)  inputs  needed  in  production  at  world  prices.
20.  Indices  of trade  liberalization  have  been estimated  by Papageorgiou,
Michaely, and Choksi (1986)  for several countries  for the period 1960-83.
Illustrative  figures  calculated  on their  basis show the  relationship  between
the indices  of trade  liberalization,  real  exchange  rates  and import  intensity
(defined  as merchandise  imports-GDP)  for  seven  non-African  countries  that  have
experienced significant trade liberalization.  In general,  .a positive
correlation  exists  between import intensity  and trade liberalization.  This
impression  is confirmed  from simple  econometric  exercises  that explain the
import-GDP  ratios  by the degree  of trade liberalization  and other  variables
such as real exchange  rate,  difference  in the rate of growth  of agriculture
vis-a-vis  the  rest  of the  economy,  and  public  deficit  as a proportion  of GDP.
The  coefficient  of the  trade  liberalization  variable  is  highly  significant  for- 19  -
three of the seven countries  and mildly  significant  in another two.  The
estimates  indicate  that for a 10 percent  increase  in trade  liberalization  --
without  a real  exchange  rate  adjustment  --  import  intensity  (import-GDP  ratio)
increases  between 2 percent and a maximum of 12 percent.  This effect,
however,  is considerably  dasmpened  in  most  countries  if  trade  liberalization  is
combined  with a real devaluation. A 15 percent  real devaluation  more than
offsets  the  effect  of 10 percent  increase  in the trade  liberalization  in all
the countries  considered.  Thus, countries  currently  undergoing  trade  reforms
can experience  a moderate  increase  in their  import  dependence, 2 but exchange
rate depreciation  and reductions  in the fiscal  deficit  might substantially
reduce  such  effect.
21.  Most  of the  African  countries  examined  here  have  recently  implemented
trade reforms in varying degrees.  Zaire  has abolished  import  licenses  for
most imports  and the  t-riff  structure  has been simplified  and its  variance  is
being reduced.  In Madagascar,  import  permits  have  been removed  from  some 25
percent  of total imports  in value terms  and plans exist to extend  the free
import  regime to about 75 percent  of the import  bill in the near future.
Additionally,  a process  of unifying  the tariff  structure  is underway. C6te
d'Ivoire  has  moved  in  the  direction  of replacing  import  licenses  with tariffs.
Import  reforms  have been somehow  less pronounced  in other  countries. Export
reforms  have been even more widespread  than import  reforms.  For example,
Zaire  is  in the process of eliminating export taxes and  licenses on
manufactured  goods as well as agriculture.  However,  certain mineral  and
agricultural  products can be exported  only by state agencies.  Ghana has
2/  It should  be noted,  however,  that  import-financing  has  often  gone  hand in
hand  with trade  reforms,  producing  this  correlation.- 20 -
abolished export  permits,  and export taxes  on natural resources  have been
replaced  by extraction  taxes. Tanzania  has eliminated  export  taxes  affecting
major  agricultural  commodities  such  as cotton,  coffee,  tobacco  and  sisal.
22.  These  types  of reforms,  however,  do not  necessarily  imply  a dramatic
opening  up of imports,  but they  are  more in the  direction  of a rationalization
of trade regimes.  In most cases,  the import-GDP  ratio  has actually  fallen
during  the  reform  process. As shown  in  Annex  Table  2 the  import-GDP  ratio  has
hardly  changed  during  1982-86  compared  to 1965-81  in the group  of countries
undergoing structural  adjustment,  and it has actually declined in the 8
African  countries  in question. A significant  increase  has occurred  only in
Asia.  Africa's  long-term import-GDP ratio  is considerably abov:  che
developing  country  average  (p.  55). Whether  future  import-GDP  relation  can  be
more flexible  than in the  past will depend  on the size  and  nature  of further
structural  and  policy  changes  and  their  effect  on imports.
III.  SECTORAL  GROWTH  AND IMPORT  REQUIREMENTS
Agricultural  SupDly
23.  This section  explores  the extent to which changes in agricultural
production  and food  manufacturing  affect  the import-growth  coefficients. To
obtain  a quantitative  handle  on the order  of magnitude,  we assume  constant
returns  to scale  in production  of agriculture  (QA)  and  non agriculture  (QN),
assume  competitive  behavior,  and  represent  the  demand  for imported  inputs  (M)
as follows:
(1)  M - aA (w,  PK'  PM)  QA + aN (w,  PK'  PM)  QN- 21 -
where  aA, ON are  the imports/output ratios of  agriculture and non-
agriculture,  respectively
w is  the  wage rate,  PK is the  price  of capital  and  pM is the  price  of
imported  inputs  and  other  intermediates
For  given  factor  prices,  the  a  coefficients  are fixed,  and  the  rate  of change
of imports  would  be:
A  A  A
(2)  Mi  PQA +  (1  - )  QN
where  a  MA/N is  the  share  of agricultural  imports  in  total  imports,  and  A
indicates  the  rate  of change. Furthermore,  we assume  that  an index  of
total  output  can  be approximated  by a Cobb-Douglas  index  Q - Q1 7 QN  '7  *where  Q
is total  output  and 0 <  7 <  1 is the share  of agricultural  in total  output.
Combining  (1)  and (2)  the  import  growth  rate  is:
A  1  +  (1-
(3)  N-  [p-7  __y  _  Q  __  Q
(1-7z)  A  (1-t)
A  A
Given  constant  returns  to scale,  a  balanced  growth  (i.e.,  QA - Q) leads
to a unitary import elasticity  with respect to output. 2a  If, however,
agricultural  growth  accelerates  keeping  the  total  growth  rate  constant,  import
growth  will decelerate,  becoming  lower  than  output  growth  provided y >  8:
2.A/OI  am  (l- P)  +  (1
aQ  <>A  Q  (  1-- 22 -
A
(4)  am  - (  ) -
alQA  (1-  )  1-v
Q Constant
24.  In general,  if  the  output  share  of sector  i is greater  than  its  share
in total  imports  (i.e.,  if li >  Pi),  and if that  sector  grows  faster  than  the
rest of the economy,  the import  elasticity  with respect  to growth  decreases.
The  share  of imported  inputs  to  agriculture  in  total  imported  inputs  is
typically  quite  low (below  10  percent)  for  most  African  countries  as shown  in
Table 5.  The  y  coefficient,  approximately  interpreted  as the  share  of
agricultural  output  in  total  output,  is about  0.19 for  Cot:e  d'Ivoire,  0.24
for  Kenya  and  0.31 for  Madagascar. For  X  0.10 and  z  - 0.25,  equation  (4)
gives  a  value  of -0.20  (and  between  -0.15  and -0.32  for  the  eight  countries).
25.  The implication  is that for each  percentage  point that agricultural
growth accelerates,  given the overall  growth  rate, the rate of growth  of
imported inputs would decrease  by 0.2 percentage  points.  Consider, for
example,  a country  whose  GDP is growing  at 2.5  percent  per  year  on a balanced
sectoral  basis with imports  also growing  at 2.5 percent.  If the share of
agriculture  in  output  is 25  nercent,  the  global  2.5  percent  growth  rate  would
also result from a 3.5 percent  agricultural  growth  and 2.17 percent  non-
agricultural  growth. This  would,  however,  reduce  the import  growth  from  2.5
percent  to 2.3 percent  per annum  and the income  elasticity  with respect  to
imports from 1-  to 0.92.  This can be a short-run and even perhaps an
intermediate  run  phenomenon  but in the  long-run,  the import  elasticity  would
again  be unitary.  The greater  is the share  of agriculture  in total  imports
the smaller  would be the effect  on the import  elasticity;  the higher the
output  share  in  agriculture,  the  larger  would  be the  effect.- 23 -
Table  5:  AGRICULTURAL  iMPORTS  OF CAPITAL  AND INTERKEDIATE  GOODS
(in  percent)
Share  of Capital  Goods  Imports  Share  of Intermediate
into  Agriculture  as  a Percent  Imports  into  Agriculture  As
of Total  Capital  Imports  Percent  of Total  Intermediate
Imports
Period  1966-68  1981-83  1966-68  1981-83
Cote  d'Ivoire  10.9  1.4  3.8  4.9
Ghana  2.0  5.1  3.3  4.6
Kenya  5.9  4.2  4.7  15.7
Madagascar  4.7  2.8  4.4  8.1
Nigeria  2.0  2.5  3.9  1.5
Tanzania  4.9  3.9  0.2  5.7
Zaire  3.7  2.3  0.0  2.4
Zambia  4.5  3.9  4.7  17.9
Notes:  Agricultural  capital  imports  SITC  712 (Agricultural  Machinery).
Total  capital  imports: SITC  7 (Machinery  and  Transport  Equipment).
Agricultural  intermediate  imports: SITC  56 (Manufactured  Fertilizers)  +
27 (Crude  Fertilizers)  +  5992 (Pesticides)  +  6951 (Agricultural  Hand
Tools).
Total intermediate  imports: SITC  2 (Raw  materials)  +  5 (chemicals)  +  6
(Basic  Manufactures)  - 54 (medical  products)  55 (perfume  and cleaning
products).
Source: UNCTAD  trade  data  system.- 24 -
26.  The change  in imported  input/output  ratio  through  time  can  be derived
from:
A
H  A  A  A (5)  (  )  - (SA  + GA)  +  (1- l)  (SN  +ON)
where  (  is the  imported  input/output  ratio;
SQand S  are  the  shares  of agricultural  and  non-agricultural  output, A  N
respectively,  in total  output;
aAand  oN are  the  sectoral  input/output  ratios;  and  A  denotes  rate
of  change.
If  both the  sectoral  shares  and  the  sectoral  import/output  coefficients  in (5)
are  constant the  aggregate  import/output  relationship  will  also  be unchanged.
A
If  a  < 0.5  (as  is  the  case  in  all  African  countries  considered  and  S  >  0
A  A  H
(note  that since SN - 1 - sAl  SA - - SN), the (-)  <  0.  The smaller is P,  the
Q
more is  this  decline  in  the  import/growth  relationship.  Similarly,  changes  in
A
aA  and  aN  can  have  significant  effects  on
27.  Table 6 shows our estimates  of the potential  effect  of increased
relative  growth  of agriculture  on the  growth  of imports  based  on equation  4.
The first  two columns  show the estimated  values  of the coefficients  t  and z
and the  third  column  shows  the  effects  of a 1 percent  acceleration  of growth
in agriculture --  holding the average total growth constant -- on the growth
of imports. The  highest  potential  for  import  growth  deceleration  is  where  the
share  of agriculture  in GDP is  high and  where  the  P  coefficient  is low.  In- 25 .
Tanzania,  Ghana  and  Madagascar,  the  effect  of increased  agriculture  growth  by
one percentage point  (keeping the overall growth near constant) is to
decelerate  import  growth  by more than  0.6 percentage  points.  Countries  with
intermediate  potential  (above  -0.3)  are  Zaire  and  C6te d'Ivoire,  while  Kenya,
Nigeria and, particularly,  Zambia  appear to have a low potential  in this
respect.  Note that Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire  have very similar  agriculture
shares in GDP but the fact that the i  coefficient  is much smaller  in the
latter  than the former,  means that C6te d'Ivoire  has a moderate  potential
and  Kenya  a low  potential  in finding  any  deceleration  in import  growth  in this
way.
table  6:  RELATIVE  GROWTH  IN  AGRICULTURE  AND  THE  IMPORT-GROWTH  RELATIONSHIP
Share  of  Agric.  Effects  on Import  Growth
Imported  Inputs  of a 1%  Point  Compensated
Share  of  to  Total  Acceleration  in
Agriculture  Imported  Inputs  Agricultural  Growth
Country  in  GDP (7)  (^)  (percentage  points)
Ghana  0.45  0.05  -0.72
C6te  d'Ivoire  0.28  0.04  -0.32
Kenya  0.26  0.12  -0.19
Madagascar  0.43  0.06  -0.65
Nigeria  0.21  0.02  -0.24
Tanzania  0.51  0.05  -0.94
Zaire  0.29  0.02  -0.38
Zambia  0.11  0.10  -0.01- 26 -
28.  Two  recent studies have estimated aggregate agricultural supply
responses to price changes for some of the African countries.  Table 7
provides  the short-  and long-term  estimates  for total agriculture  and cash
crops,  showing  high values  for the latter  and small responsiveness  for the
former. 3 Given  the  responsivenoss  of  cash  crops,  a combination  of  policies
Tsable7: AGGREGATE  AGRICULTURAL  PRICE  ELASTICITIES  OF OUTPUT  SUPPLY
FOR AFRICAN  COUNTRIES
Total  Airiculture  a/  Cash  Crops  b/
Short  run  Long  run  Short-run  Long-run
C6te  d'Ivoire  0.13  0.13  0.90  1.5
Ghana  0.20  0.34  0.40  1.0
Kenya  0.10  0.16  0.20  2.0
Madagascar  0.10  0.14  0.20  0.50
sources: A/  Bond (1983).
hi  Berthelemy  and  Morrisson  (1985).
improving  the  domestic  real  prices  of agriculture  and  expanding  investments  in
it can lead  to an expansion,  not only  of the  cash  crop  sector  but also  of the
subsistence  sector.  A study by Siggel (1986)  on Zaire is one of the few
analyses  that  provide  estimates  of effective  protection  rates  on a sectoral
basis. Unfortunately,  the  data  are  only  for  1970-73. Siggel  reports  negative
effective  protection  for  both the  agricultural  and food  manufacturing  sectors
of the order -40 percent and -42 percent,  respectively.  Data for Nigeria
i/  A  study by Peterson (1979), however, obtained  aggregate  agricultural
supply elasticities  ranging between 1.25 and 1.66 for 25 developing
countries  including  some  from  Africa.- 27 .
corresponding  to 1980 in the World  Development  Report (1986)  indicates  that
the relative  protection  of agriculture  vis-a-vis  the  manufacturing  sector  is
about 0.35.  This tendency  may have been reversed  to some extent in the
eighties, but  there seems to have been policy reversals and continuing
discrimination  against  agriculture  to a  significant  degree.  The instability
of  relative  prices  may  also partly  explain  the rather disappointing
performance  of agriculture  and its slow  price response:  the coefficient  of
variability  of the  agriculture/non-agriculture  relative  prices  for the  period
1970-85  ranges  between  7 percent  for C6te d'Ivoire  to 21 percent  for  Zaire.
There  is  a  negative  correlation  (-0.44)  between  the  coefficient  of variability
of the relative  price  of agricultural  commodities  and the  average  growth  rate
of agriculture  GDP for the  period  1971-85  for the  eight  countries.  Despite
progress,  there  also remain  large  disincentives  to agriculture  exports  (Annex
Table 4).  Furthermore,  the ratio of farmgate  to border  prices of various
other agricultural  commodities,  both export  and import  substitutes,  is in
general substantially  less than one, according  to Binswanger  and Scandizzo
(1983). In Senegal,  for  example,  this  ratio  was  about  0.6 for  groundnuts  and
0.65 for  cotton  (both  are export  commodities). For import  substitutes,  rice
domestic  prices  were about 55 percent  of border  prices  in Ghana,  while they
were 80 percent in Senegal,  although  this has increased  subsequently.  In
Zambia, domestic maize prices  were only 75 percent of index prices  while
groundnuts  were  about  70  percent  of  border  prices. 4
§/  For additional  estimates,  see  Jaeger  (1987). For  the  period  1970-85,  he
calculated official producer price/world  price ratios for export and
import-competing  commodities  in  Kenya,  Mali,  Malawi  and  Nigeria.- 28 -
29.  According to the foregoing,  changes in the sectoral  struc:ture  of
growth can have significant effects on import requirements of African
countries.  The secular  trend  of declining  agricultural  share in production
would  raise  the  import  intensity  of  GDP.  On the  other  hand,  emphasis  has  been
laid in recent  years  on expanding  the growth  rate of agriculture  and related
sectors, partly via  the removal of disincentives.  Increased domestic
production  in agriculture  reduces  food imports;  the share  of food imports  in
total  is  10-15  percent. The  lower  import-intensity  of agricultural  production
is  particularly  significant.
To the extent that policies of reversing price disincentives  in
agriculture  and other complementary  policies increase  the sector's
growth,  they would also, at least temporarily,  reduce the import-
growth  coefficients.
This  possibility  pcr se,  however,  should  hardly  be grounds  to consciously  try
to change  sectoral.  output  composition. Furthermore,  the  effects  of changes  in
production  in  subsistence  agriculture  and  their  effects  on import  requirements
need  to  be examined  thoroughly.
Industrial  Restructuring
30.  The  industrial sector is disproportionately  import-intensive  in
production  in the  countries  examined. The imported  input  to output  ratio  in
C6te d'Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar and Zambia, according to input-output
tables,  are  several  times  higher  in  non-food  manufacturing  than  in the  rest  of
the  economy. On the  whole,  the  import  dependence  of manufacturing  activities
is high relative  to the rest of the  economy,  although  this indicator  varies- 29
significantly  from  country  to country.  For  example,  in 1952 only 25 percent
of manufacturing  inputs  were imported  in Zimbabwe  compared  to over  70 percent
in  Ghana  and  Tanzania. The  final  manufacturing  goods,  on the  other  hand,  have
been wvll protected, indicated  by declining shares of final imports in
manufacturing  supply  (see especially  the Bank reports  on Tanzania,  1987 and
Kenya,  1987).  The combination  of protection  to final  goods and  high import
dependency  in  production  imply  relatively  high  effective  protection  rates.
31.  A number  of industrial  sector  reports 5 discuss  wide-ranging  problems
faced by the  sector, some of which are directly related to the import
question.  An  in-depth review of Tanzania at the firm-level has been
revealing.  A wide dispersion  in protection  and efficiency  is noted,  with
efficient  manufacturing  industries  being denied  scarce  resources  which flow
disproportionately  to inefficient  firms.  Survey  results  suggest  that firms
which  have substantially  higher  effective  protection  rates  and  are larger  and
more import-dependent  are also  less  efficient. Reviews  of Ghana  and Ethiopia
also  indicate the association  between high and widely varying rates  -of
effective  protection  and  high  and  varying  inefficiency.  Overall  efficiency  is
superior  in Kenya  and Zimbabwe;  at the same time,  these  cases  also reveal  a
positive relation  among protection,  import  dependency  and inefficiency  (in
terms  of domestic  resource  costs.)
32.  The  high and rising  import  dependency  in Tanzania  coexists  with low
and declining  capacity  utilization  --  53 percent in 1976 to 25 percent in
1985.  Imports  to support  the 25 percent  capacity  utilization  are six times
the  value  of industrial  exports. Severe  underutilization  of capacity  is  also
found  in Ghana. While  increased  imports  can increase  utilization  of existing
i/  See  World  Bank  1987a,b,c,e,g.*-  30 -
capacity,  the  studies  do  not  conclude  that  such increased  capacity  utilization
is the  answer. A fundamental  problem  noted  in Ghana  and elsewhere  in  Africa
is excess capacity with respect to domestic demand and availability  of
imported  and domestic  inputs.  In Tanzania,  only selective  increases  in the
utilization of existing capacity.  are recommended  together  with industrial
reorientation  with better  allocation  of recurrent  sources.  In Zimbabwe,  on
the other hand, existing  capital stock is highly  utilized,  but old.  The
sector  is working  at 80 percent  capacity,  but there is the  need for  capital
replacement.
33.  Although  there  are  no conceptual  grounds  to expect  this result,  the
work on Tanzania also brings out  a broad  inverse relationship  between
efficiency  and capital  intensity  in general. Activities  with a higher  than
average  capital-labor  ratio  have a 15 percent  lower  productivity  than those
with below  average  capital-intensity.  Similar  results  are  found  in the  Kenya
work.  Capital-intensive  activities seem more  inefficient, a  finding
corroborated  by regression  analysis.  The link of this relationship  with
effective  protection  is also noted.  Price interventions  --  interest  rate
subsidies  and  wage protection  --  which  encourage  capital  intensive  production
would also than seem to be associated  with relative  inefficiency. Increased
import content of production  seems to go with these features,  and policy
adjustments  that  are  typical  under  structural  adjustment  would  seem  to  have  an
import-saving  characteristic.
34.  The foregoing  has  brought  out  elements  in  an industrial  strategy  that
have  the effect of reducing import intensity of growth.  The need for
rehabilitation  and new capital  equipment  has also been noted  which  have the
opposite effect.  Furthermore, a decline in overall imports needed in
production  during the 1980s  must also be taken into account.  As shown in- 31 -
Table 8, the import shares in GDP have declined in 1982-88 compared to
1965-81. These  reductions  are also true for  intermediate  and capital  goods.
(See  p. 32  also).
Tahle  8:  IMPORTS'  SHARES  IN GDP
Seven  countries  A/  Eight  coutitries
1965-81  1982-86  1965-81  1982-86
Food  2.3  1.7  2.3  1.7
Non-food  consumer
goods  1.2  1.1  1.2  0.8
Intermediates  6.1  3.9  5.9  3.8
Fuel  2.9  3.0  1.6  1.4
Capital  goods  36
Total  18.7  13.6  17.8  12.1
A/  Excluding  Nigeria.
Notes:  These  are  shares  of import  goods  calculated  at  current  prices. For  a
description  of import  categories  see  Table  2.
Source: Same  as Table  2.
These  changes  both reflect  the  flexibility  in the  import-GDP  relation
and raise the question  of how much further  compressibility  can be
expected  in the face of the  need for  restoring  much-needed  imports.
The  composition and quality of imports remain key concerns in
relation  to  needed  structural  changes.- 32  -
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IV.  MACROECONOMIC  POLICY  AND  IMPORTS
Aagregate  Demand
35.  Imports  of final  goods  and  capital  goods  are  more  directly  related  to
total expenditures or absorption than to real income, while imports of
intermediate  goods are probably directly dependent on real income.  The
absorption-real  income  ratio  seems  to have varied  significantly  over time in
most of the African countries  examined.  Moreover,  absorption  can also be
affected by macroeconomic  policies,  particularly  fiscal  policies.  To the
extent that absorption grows at a  slower pace than real income during.
adjustment,  the import-growth  relationship  would  be lowered  at least in the
short term.  The composition of absorption (i.e.,  private consumption,
government  consumption,  private  investment  and  public  investments)  can-also  be
expected to play a significant  role in determining  imports.  The various
components  of absorption  do  not in  general  exert  the  same  pressure  on imports.
When the  import intensities of  the components of total absorption are
significantly  different,  changes  in the  structure  of absorption  have important
effects  on the import-GDP  relationship. Such adjustment  of the  structure  of
absorption may have  a more significant effect and relevance than the
adjustment  of total  absorption.
36.  A  real devaluation  can have expenditure-switching  effects through
increasing  the price of tradeables,  Including importables,  possibly  also
reducing  the  import-growth  coefficients.  This  effect  depends  on the  extent  to
which  the real domestic price  of imports increases through a nominal
devaluation. If quantitative  import  restrictions  are significant,  to begin
with, the effect  of a devaluation  is likely  to be redundant.  Moreover,  a
nominal  devaluation  will change  the relative  price of tradeables  (including- 34 -
imports) only if complementary  wage, fiscal and monetary  policies  are in
effect.  Even if devaluation  increases  real  prices  of tradeables  and imports,
import  substitution  would  depend  on the  supply  response  that  it induces,  which
in turn  depends  inter  &li  on factor  mobility,  technological  and  human  capital
availability,  and  on the  adequacy  of infrastructure  and other  public  goods  to
permit  a  realignment  of production  toward  tradeables  which  are likely  to  be a
more intensive  users  of these  goods.
37.  The quantitative significance  of exchange  rate and absorption/GDP
adjustments  on imports  can  be brought  out  by the  estimation  of a reduced  form
import  equations  of the  following  type (all  variables  are  in the  log  form).
(6)  M  _ b0 +  blYt+  b2 (A/Y)t  +  b3et  + b4Pmt  b5 t_l
where  mt  are  aggregate  real  marchandise  imports  in time  t,
Yt  is  real  GDP
At  is  absorption
et  is the  exchange  rate  (local  currency  per  dollar)  deflated  by the
GDP  price  deflator
Pmt  is the  dollar  import  price  index.
38.  The  present  specification  includes  the  absorption-GDP  ratio,  which  is
closely  related to net capital  inflows:  an excess  of absorption  over GDP
reflects  increases  in net  capital  inflows  and  declines  in reserves. Thus  A/Y
in part reflects  the positive  relationship  of imports  to external  borrowing
and financing. In  contrast  to conventional  import  demand  specifications  that
include  a "domestic'  price  of imports  (Pf)  as the  product  of the  world  price
and  the effective exchange rate (e), equation (6) includes  an external- 35 -
(dollar)  import  price (p*)  and the  exchange  rate  as separate  variables. The
domestic price of imports  is an aggregate  price of:  (i) fully tradeable
imports,  with  prices  that  can  be approximated  by the  parity  specification  pf  -
(1  +  t)ep*,  where  t is the  average  tariff,  and (ii)  imports  subject  to  binding
quantitative restrictions,  which have an endogenous  domestic  price.  This
latter  price depends on domestic  demand conditions,  and factors  that shift
domestic supply, including the exchange rate (as it affects the cost of
imported  inputs)  and  the  import  quotas. Therefore,  the  effects  of e and  p* on
imports  are not likely  to be identical  as imposed  by conventional  estimates
using  pf as an explanatory  variable.
39.  The long-term  imptort  elasticities  for 1965-d3  in Table 9 show the
expected  signs  and  are  generally significant.  The  high  real income
elasticities  obtained  by previous  studies  are  confirmed  by a value  of over 1
on average for the GDP coefficient. The average  cross country  elasticity
values  for the  absorption/GDP  and  exchange  rate  variables  are  approximately  i
and -1, respectively. For example,  a 2 percent  real income  growth  would  be
achieved  with about  a 0.5 percent  expansion  of imports  if the  absorption/GDP
ratio  is falling  by 1 percent. If at the  same  time  the  real  exchange  rate  is
depreciating  by 0.6 percent,  there  would  be little  increase  in imports. The
hypothesis  of identical  elasticities  cannot  be statistically  rejected  only  for
C6te dllvoire and Kenya.  Thus the conventional  procedure of using the
calculated  domestic  price Pf instead  of e and Pm as separate  regressors  is
justified  only in  2 of the  8  countries. Furthermore,  insofar  as absorption  is
in part determined  by GDP, exchange  rate and import  prices,  the  model  should
be closed  with an absorption  equation  which should  be jointly  estimated  with
the  import  demand  equations  using  simultaneous  equation  methods. This  would
permit  the  calculation  of the  total  effect  of the  rest  of the  independent36 -
Table  9:  LONG-TERM  AGGREGATE  IMPORT  ELASTICITIES
Absorption/  Exchange  Dollar  Import
Real  GDP  GDP  Rate  Prices  R2
C6te  d'Ivoire  1.14  -0.52  -1.04  -1.03  0.96
(7.99)  (-0.64)  (-9.31)  (-2.43)
Ghana  1.07  5.04  0.43  0.21  0.72
(0.46)  (0.88)  (1.61)  (0.29)
Kenya  0.77  1.99  -1.09  -0.86  0.68
(3.17)  (3.44)  (-4.36)  (-2.17)
Madagascar  1.50  2.72  -1.28  -1.43  0.79
(2.92)  (2.51)  (-1.99)  (-3.79)
Nigeria  0.94  2.77  -0.92  -0.41  0.95
(2.48)  (4.31)  (-5.86)  (-0.90)
Tanzania  0.89  3.58  -0.21  -0.62  0.39
(1.22)  (2.55)  (-0.51)  (-1.41)
Zaire  2.75  0.90  -. 40  -. 98  0.86
(3.18)  (0.74)  (-1.01)  (-3.32)
Zambia  0.47  2.16  -1.87  -2.05  0.85
(0.35)  (2.24)  (-1.98)  (-3.94)
Note:  t-statistics  are in  brackets;  estimates  for  Tanzania,  Ghana  and  Nigeria
are  based  on the  period  1965-86,  while  the  rest  are  for  1965-83.
variables,  including  the  direct  effect  as well as the effects  via absorption
changes.  If the exchange  rate also reduces  the absorption-GDP  ratio,  then
considering  this indirect effect (the expenditure  reducing effect)  would
enhance  the  actual  effect  of  devaluation  on imports.
40.  Annex Table 4 shows absorption  as a percent of GDP in the eight
countries  for 1970-85,  while Annex Table 5 presents  estimates  of the real
exchange rate for 1965-86.  Together, these data show how, historically,- 37 -
absorption  has exceeded  income  and the  real  exchange  rate  has appreciated,  as
well as how demand  management  has produced  changes  in the  opposite  direction
in some cases during  the 1980s.  The possibilities  for further  reduction  in
aggregate demand and real exchange  rate depreciation  vary from country  to
country.  Although each country case is different, some representation
classification  seems  useful.
Taking absorption and the real exchange  rate together,  Kenya and
Madagascar, and perhaps C6te d'Ivoire show a  relatively steady
pattern  and do not show extreme  disequilibrium. While the others
indicate  much  greater  disequilibria,  Zaire  and  Zambia  on the  one  hand
and  Ghana  and Nigeria  on the  other  have  adjusted,  in  varying  degrees
and  with differing  scope  .for  further  action.  Tanzania  continues  to
show  more  disequilibrium  in these  respects.
While these  figures  suggest  that there  is room  for further  adjustment  across
countries,  there  are obvious  limits  to such possibilities. The relationship
between  absorption  and GDP can  be reduced  somewhat,  but the consequences  in
terms  of employment  and growth  can be negative,  particularly  when this  ratio
reaches  certain  critical  levels. Similarly,  the  use  of nominal  devaluation  to
adjust  the  real  exchange  rate  can  be  very effective  when the  domestic  currency
is overvalued,  and in the  presence  of complementary  fiscal,  monetary  and  wage
policies,  and  seldom  otherwise.
Structure  of  Absorption
41.  In order  to shed some light on the issue of the structure of
absorption  rather  than  its  level,  were the  import  equations  reestimated  using- 38 -
disaggregated  expenditures.  The  question  is whether changes in the
composition  of expenditures,  maintaining  total  expenditures  constant,  can  have
significant  implications  for imports.  Expenditures  were disaggregated  into
three categories,  namely, private  consumption,  government  consumption,  and
investment. One possible  criticism  of Equation  (6)  above  is that if exports
are exogenous, the equation would be very close to an identity (excess
expenditures  minus income  equals  trade  deficit),  although  the fact that the
dependent variable is only merchandise  imports rather than total imports
somewhat  mitigates  this  problem. For this  reason,  income  and the  absorption-
GDP ratio  are now excluded,  and substituted  for by the three  components  of
aggregate  expenditures.  Thus,  the  specification  estimated  is the  following:
(t  0 1E1 + cE 2 +  c 3E3 + c4et + c5Pmt  +c6mt1
where E1 is real  private  consumption,  E2 is real government  consumption,  and
E3 is real  investments.  All  other  variables  are  previously  defined,  and  as in
(6),  all  variables  are  in log  form.
42.  Table  10  shows  the  long-term import demand,  elasticities from
estimating  (7)  for  each  of the  cou-ntries. 6 These  results  confirm  the  influence
of the exchange  rate in determining  imports,  but the quantitative  importance
of the  exchange  rate  is somehow  lower  in  this  case  than  when total  absorption
§/  The high R2 and t-statistics  are generally  high.  The h  test for no
autocorrelation  is rejected  in 3 of t1e  countries  while in 3  more it is
ambiguous  and is accepted  in two other  countries. Moreover,  all signs
with the exception of private consumption in Ivory Coast have the
expected  ones.  There  are three  other  "wrong"  signs  but the  coefficients
are  not  significantly  different  from  zero.- 39  -
Tabl.  10:  LOS-TIN AOPEGATS  I ZW  ULA$STfCmUo  16U-63
(ordinary  Least  Square.)
Me AtOAea.rrlatIln
Hypothesis  Is
El  *2  Lg  Statistic
Ghabn  -0.16  0.85  0.40  -1.01  -0.31  0.61  *  o
(-0.26)  (3-03) (2.92) (-1.05)  (-1.60)  (-1.051
Iwery  Cast  -0.65  0.64  0.22  -0.63  -0.54  0.66  neJeet
(2.11)  (6.49) (3.04)  (-14.05)  (-3.1).  (2.611
Kenya  0.16  0.02  0.52  -1.03  -0.61  0.64  NA
(0.13)  (0.03) (2.76) (-1.66)  (-1.00)
!d-agaaar  0.75  0.96  0.10  -1.44  -1.33  o.7  r.Jit 
(1.15)  (1.90) (0.41) (-2.06)  (-3.62)  la."2]
141o.ir  -0.7?  0.19  0.92  -0.03  -0.25  0.96  resjct
(-0.64)  (0.71) (6.66) (-1.06)  (-0.29)  t2.16
Taunanli  0.90  0.61  O.66  0.36  -0.64  0.61  NA
(1.36)  (2.62) (4.33)  (0-69)  (-099)
Zambia  0.35  -0.03  0.5  -0.92  -0.96  o."  NA
(0.05) (-0.06) (2.80) (-1.04)  (-1-.6)
Zare  0.36  0.57  0.46  -0.16  -0.06  0.66  accpt
(0.1I)  (2.72) (2.62) (-0.53)  (-2.34)  (0.043- 40 -
rather than its components is considered.  The effects of the different
categories  of expenditures  on imports  is quite  heterogeneous.  In  Ivory  Coast,
Zaire,  Madagascar,  and Ghana it appears  that government  expenditure  is the
most import-intensive  of all.  This would imply that decreasing  government
consumption  and increasing  private  consumption  and/or  investments  by che  same
amount  could  result  in  a  net decrease  of imports. Nigeria  and  Tanzania  appear
to have the  highest imported  compone.at  in investment,  while Ivory  Coast  and
Madagascar  have the  lowest.
43.  The net effect of a  trade reform cum exchange rate adjustment
package  on the  level  of imports  is thus  uncertain,  at least  in the  short  term.
While  a trade  reform  effort  may be seen as a partial  opening  up of imports,
the  impact  depends  on the  nature  and the  size  of reforms  and  on complementary
policies.  The widely proposed substitution  of tariffs for quantitative
restrictions,  and reductions in the tariff dispersion,  need not increase
import  levels,  but  only improve  efficiency  of the  trade  regime. A lowering  of
quantitative  restrictions  and tariffs  will increase  imports,  but they can  be
compensated  by a depreciation  of the  exchange  rate,  if the  latter  can indeed
be translated  into  a real  depreciation  with supporting  macroeconomic  policies.
Successful  export  protection  almost  always  requires  the  increased  provision  of
inputs  at world  prices. Any significant  increase  in non-traditional  exports,
therefore,  may be expected  to place increased  demand  on imports  of inputs
needed  in  production  of exports.
44.  The previous  analysis  concerns  the determinants  of imports,  while
the  import-GDP  ratios  are  also of concern. Furthermore,  in estimating  import
equations  it  is likely  that  serious problems  of simultaneity exist.
Particularly  in the  case  where  there  exist  binding foreign exchange- 41  -
constraints,  the  causal  relation  goes  from  real  imports  to real income  rather
than from real income  to real imports,  as postulated  in conventional  import
demand  equations. As indicated  before,  an overwhelming  proportion  of African
imports  consist  of  capital  goods  and  intermediates.  Thus,  under  conditions  of
import  restrictions  in response  to binding  foreign  exchange  constraints,  real
income  would  be largely  determined  by the  import  possibilities.  It is likely
that in part of the period  under analysis,  imports  in much of Africa  were
essentially  determined  by foreign  exchange  availability  rather  than  by demand
factors.  In other  years,  when foreigr.  exchange  constraints  have been less
restrictive,  it is likely  that imports  have  been largely  determined  by demand
factors  as specified  in the  previous  models.  Since  it is very difficult  to
say a priori  in what years  of the sample period the foreign exchange
restrictions  were or were not binding,  consistent  estimation  of the import
equations  may  not  be entirely  feasible.
Forei_n  Exchanee  Variables
45.  To shed some light  or the role of foreign  exchange  availability  in
the determination  of imports  we extend  Equation  (6)  to include  a proxy for
foreign  exchange  availability. In analyzing  foreign  exchange  constraints  on
imports,  authors have considered several explanatory  variables (Hemphill,
Moran, etc.) including some or all of the following:  exports, capital
inflows,  changes  in foreign  exchange  reserves. If one uses only  a subset  of
these variables,  however,  the estimates  are likely  to be unstable  because
their  effect  will be heavily  dependent  on underlying  stock  variables  such  as
net  debt. The effect,  for  example,  of an expansion  of exports  on imports  will
be  very small  for  a country  when  highly  indebted  (it  may  use increasing  export- 42 -
revenues  only to pay the debt service)  while it will be much larger  in a
period  of low debt (when  exports  may have autonomously  expanded). If on the
other hand all  flow foreign exchange variables are used,  then one is
estimating  something  very close to an identity  --  imports  equal to foreign
exchange available for imports. 7 The implication  is that not all flow
variables  can  be used,  and that  stock  variables  should  be used to account  for
stock  adjustment  processes.
46.  The basic  issue is what variables (flow and particularly stock
variables) should be used.  If domestic and foreign exchange  wealth are
perfect substitutes, foreign exchange constraints  are not likely to be
binding.  If, for example,  domestic  assets  or income  in domestic  currency
could  be freely  used to  pay  debt  or imports,  consideration  of foreign  exchange
constraints  would  be unnecessary. On the other  extreme,  if domestic  wealth
and  foreign  exchange  wealth  cannot  be substituted  at all,  the  issue  of foreign
exchange  availability  becomes  critical.  Many LDCs are likely  to have some
possibilities  of substitution  (example:  Latin American  countries  in their
debt swap  operations  suggest  some  substitutability)  at varying  degrees. It is
possible  that African  countries are closer to the extreme of little
substitutability  than to perfect substitution,  and therefore  we assume a
dichotomization  between the allocation  of domestic  wealth and of foreign
exchange  wealth.
47.  Under this assumption one can postulate  an intertemporal  problem
where  an increasing  and concave  function  of imported  goods  (welfare  function)
1/  Some previous  studies  have actually  used practically  all flow foreign
exchange  variables  in  explaining  imports.- 43 -
is maximized  subject to an intertemporal  budget constraint  (or feasibility
constraint)  indicating  that the present  value  of future  excesses  of imports
over exports need to equal the current stock of foreign exchange  assets
defined as the level of foreign exchange  reserves  less the :utock  of net
international  debt.  Solution  of this problem  gives the import  level as a
function  of the net stock of foreign  exchange  assets,  exports (current  and
expected  future  exports),  terms of trade, real  income or  total real
expenditures  and the  real  domestic  price  of imports  (the  objective  function  is
also a function of these last two variables, i.e., the effectiveness  of
imports  in promoting  welfare is dependent  on real income  level  and domestic
priems).
48.  Table  11  presents  long-term  import  elasticities  specified  in  a manner
consistent  with the previously  discussed  intertemporal  model.  Specification
includes  the same  variables  as the static  import  Equation  (6)  in addition  to
the  foreign  exchange  variables,  namely  the  value  of exports  and  debt.  In this
specification  these two variables  are considered  as a ratio rather  than as
separate variables.  All  the coefficients  associated  with this ratio are
positive  as expected,  but not all  of them are  significant. The coefficients
for  Zaire  and  particularly  for  Nigeria  are  not  significant.  The  virtual  value
of zero  of the  coefficient  for  Nigeria  is reasonable,  as Nigeria  is not  likely
to  have suffered  serious  foreign  exchange  restrictions  during  the  period  under
analysis.  The lack of significance  of the coefficient  for Zaire is less
understandable.
49.  A  remarkably  result is the high  degree of similarity of  the
export/debt  elasticities  of imports  for C6te d'Ivoire,  Kenya and Tanzania
which fluctuate  between  0.21 to 0.23,  while the elasticities  for Ghana and- 44  -
Table  11:  LONO-TEtM  IMPORT  ELASTICITIES C0NSIDERING  FOREIGN
EXCHUNGE  CONSTRAINTS  (1970-46)
Dollar
Real  Absorption/  Exchange  Input  Export/  - 2
GOP  GOP  Rate  Price  Debt  R
Coto  d'Iwoir.  0.33  0.35  -0.72  -0.43  0.22  0.97
(38.5)  (3.85)  (-10.01)  (-2.71)  (2.32)
Ghana  0.24  4.72  -0.07  -0.54  0.65  0.32
(0.22)  (1.71)  (-0.42)  (-1.90)  (2.74)
Konya  0.33  2.58  -0.69  -.. 62  0.21  0.94
(4.78)  (10.21)  (-4.03)  (-7.35)  (5.75)
Madagascar  1.73  2.37  -0.51  -0.56  0.09  0.32
(2.08)  (2.53)  (-1.67)  (-2.35)  (2.24)
N;igria  3.06  . 3.19  -0."3  -1.02  0.01  0.97
(14.11)  (6.39)  (-11.03)  (-8.23)  (0-00)
Tanzania  1.53  3.09  -0.8  -0.53  0.23  0.67
(1.63)  (3.40)  (-1.46)  (-2.45)  (2.64)
Zilrf  1.92  1.09  -0.10  -0.71  0.0  0.95
(1.52)  (0.97)  (-O.55)  (-S.29)  (0.94)
Zabi;  -3.00  2.30  0.54  U0.4  0.56  0.95
(-1.43)  (1.14)  (1.12)  (0.39)  (2.25)
Median  1.23  2.46  -0.51  -0.53  0.22
Note.:  h-statistic  or  ARI  test. showed that only  th,  equation  for  Madagascar  had
autocorrelation.  All  eetimtee  arm  OLS except  thoes  for Madagasrcr  which  used  a
CORC  procedure  to  correct for  autocorrelation.  The mediane are  computed
excluding  etimates with  *wrng' signs. The  median  real  GOP elasticity  excludes
Nigeria  (as  well  as  Zomblo) due to  the  extremely  high  elasticity  obtained  for
Nigeria.- 45 -
Zambia are also similar at about 0.6.  Of all the countries sharing a
significant  effect  of the  export/debt  variable,  Madagascar  exhibits  the  lowest
elasticity  at 0.09,  indicating  that  a 10  percent  increase  in  indebtness  causes
a reduction  of imports  by less  than  1  percent.
50.  The  exchange  rate  elasticities  tend  to diminish  in  absolute  values  in
most countries  from a median  value of about -0.98  in the case  where foreign
exchange variables are not accounted  (Table  9) to abtt  -0n51  when these
variables  are  considered.  The  income  elasticities  also  become  smaller  in  most
countries  with the  exception  of  Nigeria  and  Tanzania  which  show  a substantial
increase. The general  tendency  for  the  price  and income  elasticities  to fall
is reasonable. 8 - It is likely that the export-debt  ratio is positively
correlated  with income  and  negatively  correlated  with the  exchange  rate. When
the export/debt  ratio is high, either  exports  are large  pulling  real income
higher  or the  stock  debt  is  low  implying  relatively  less  debt  service  payments
and more availability  of new credits,  increasing  real income.  On the other
hand, the real exchange  rate is likely,-  at least  partially,  to respond  to a
deterioration  of the  external  situation,  thus  being  negatively  correlated  with
the foreign  exchange  variables. The implication  is that  the  positive  income
coefficient  and  the  negative  price  coefficient  in  Table  6  were also  capturing
part of the  effect  of the  export-/debt  ratio. When  we control  for  this  ratio
in  Table  11,  this  indirect  effects  on real  income  and  price  are  excluded,  thus
explaining  the generally  lower  absolute  value of the new exchange  rate and
price  elasticities.
t./  Notice,  however,  that the  periods  of estimation  are different;  but this
is  also  true  when  we compare  the  estimates  of Table  11  with estimates  for
the same period, 1970-86,  without accounting  for the foreign  exchange
variables.- 46 -
51.  The compilexity  of th- import  effects  of an adjustment  package is
brought  out  by the  foregoing  discussion.  The  rationale  for  policies  of impoxt
liberalization  is both to improve  the afficiency  of the trade  regime  and to
increase  the share of trade in GDP thereby  contributing  to growth.  In the
face  of foreign  exchange  constraints,  however,  increases  in imports  would  be
of concern.  The econometric  results suggest that imports are affected
significantly  also by the types  of public  expenditure  and the real exchange
rate.  An adju.stment  package  that  includes  expenditure  revisions  and  exchange
rate  depreciation,  in  addition  to  import  reform,  does  not  necessarily  put  an
upward  pressure  on the import-GDP  ratio.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  FURTHER  WORK
52.  A wide range  of estimates  support  the  proposition  that  imports  would
grow at least as fast as output during long periods of sustained  income
expansion. This is  particularly  true  if the  effect  on import  demand  of income
is considered  holding  other  factors  the  same. The  income  elasticity  of demand
for  imports  for  the  African  countries  examined  is  by and  large  above  one. The
price  elasticity  of demand  is  more than  minus  one.  Thus the  partial  measured
impact  of income  and of relative  price  changes  on imports  over the long-term
has been more than proportionate. The estimates  also indicate  significant
country  differences  in their  income  and  price  effects.
53.  At the same time, the levels  and variations  of imports  observed  in
Africa  may be in good measure  the effects  of changes  in aid financing  and
exports. The  actual  imports  may, to a large  extent,  be the  result  of changes
in foreign  exchange  availability  which is reflected  in the widespread  QRs.- 47 -
Nevertheless,  the composite  elasticity  resu't.?ng  from all these factors  --
price, income,  QRs --  has been far above one during  the l970a,  but highly
variable  in the 1980S  given  reductions  in imports  and GDP.  The import-GDP
ratio in Africa  has been well above the developing  country  average  in the
1960s  and  70s,  and to a lesser  extent  in the  1980s. The import-GDP  ratio  for
Africa  and the eight countries  in question  was about 24 percent  in 1965-81
compared to developing  countries'  and Asia's average  of 17 percent.  The
import dependency of production  in some of the African countries  is more
significantly  higher than the developing  country  average.  Smaller  country
sizes and less diversity  in structure  should  explain  a part of the higher
import  ratios  in  Africa.  On the other  hand,  exchange  rate overvaluation  may
have  understated  the  past  ratios  statistically.
54.  These  trends  argue  for  special  attention  to  the  financing
requirements for imports needed for growth.  The acute reduction  in the
imports  of intermediate  and  capital  goods  in the  1980s  seems  to  also imply  the
need to catch  up --  to rehabilitate  and rebuild  productive  capacity. If the
past  elasticities  of  over  one  were to  hold approximately  during  the  1980s  as a
whole, the acute import  reduction  thus far would argue for especially  high
elasticities  during  the  rest  of the  decade.
For Sub-Saharan  countries  targeting  GDP growth  of 4 percent  over a
decade  or more, long-term  elasticities  much less than one  would  not
be realistic  based  on past  patterns  of growth. This is  even  more so
if  use  of the  past  long-term  elasticities  were  qualified  by reference
to the  dip in importation  in the  recent  past.  In the  aggregate  and
on the face of it, therefore, there would seem to be optimism
regarding  future  import-output  relation  in the  present  projections.- 48 -
55.  The next question,  however,  is whether  the  past is a good guide  for
the  future,  and  how the  degree  of  dependence  of  growth  on imports  is likely  to
change.  Considering that the African import-GDP  ratios are Above other
developing  country  groups' ratios, how  rigidly should the  "base" be
considered. To the extent  there  is considerable  flexibility  in this  regard
the  high historical  import  elasticities  with respect  to income  found in the
1970s  do not necessarily  mean that the import  compression  in the 1980s  is a
necessary  obstacle  to fast  growth,  at least  for  short  periods  of time.  More
significant  for looking  ahead  over the  medium-term  are structural  and policy
changes that influence imports.  Some of these effects  may be one shot,
whereas  others  are  more  sustained.
The substantial  variation  in  the  import-GDP  ratio  already  observed  in
the short-term  highlights  the flexibility  in this relation.  More
importantly  perhaps,  structural  and policy  redirection  in the  future
can change the import dependency:  some factors  would reduce it
whereas others would call for more  imports, but  in differing
compositions  and  quality  of  use from  the  past.
56.  It was noted that  the secular  decline  in agricultu*re's  share  of GDP
would  increase the  import content of production.  But  changes in the
composition  of growth towards  agriculture  and food manufacturing  which can
result from reductions in past distortions  may produce,  as a by-product,
temporary  reductions  in the  dependence  of growth  on imports,  both on account
of  lower  food imports and  the lower import-intensity of agricultural
production. The  paper  has  provided  a simple  framework  which  could  be used to- 49 -
quantify the  implications of sectoral growth changes and factor price
adjustments  for import  growth. The higher  is agriculture's  share  in GDP and
the lower is the share of agricultural  imported  inputs  in total imported
inputs  (as  in  Tanzania  and  Ghana)  the  greater  will  be the  reduction  in import
growth  from  accelerated  agricultural  growth. Much  more wcrk  needs  to  be done
for specific countries in order to make this framework operational.  In
particular,  substantially  more  disaggregation at  the sectoral level,
especially  to include  the  effects  of subsistence  production,  is required. It
was also indicated  that in many cases  a restructuring  of industry  to achieve
greater  efficiency  would  be associated  with a lowering  of import  dependency,
for example  in Ghana.  At the  same time,  different  types  of imports  might  be
needed  to  meet the  requirements  of rehabilitation  and  redirection  of industry,
as in Tanzania,  or increased  imports  might  be needed  to replace  and  modernize
outdated  capital  equipment,  as in  Zimbabwe.
The net effect of agricultural  and industrial  adjustments  would
depend  on what happens  to their  relative  sectoral  shares  and on the
tyne of reorientation  of production  found  efficient. These effects
can  usually  be anticipated  with  available  sector-level  information.
57.  The  role  of  absorption  as  a determinant  of imports  was  also  examined.
Changes  in the  absorption  to income  ratio  can be an important  determinant  of
imports,  and policies that affect  absorption  have direct implications  for
imports  and the import-growth  relationship. While  for some  of the countries
under  consideration 1 adjustments  of the level  of absorption  is feasible,  this
may also  be a limited  avenue  for achieving  further  reductions  in import-GDP- 50 -
coefficients. Particularly  significant  effects  of absorption  on imports  were
found  in  Tanzania,  Nigeria  and  Madagascar;  recent  absorption-GDP  coefficients
were especially  high in Tanzania  and Madagascar. A preliminary  analysis  of
the relationship  between the structure (rather than the total level)  of
absorption  and imports  was  also  performed.
The results  suggest that changes in the composition  of absorption
rather  than the  level  of absorption  can  be especially  significant  in
increasing  the  flexibility  of overall  import  dependency.  There  could
be high payoffs to examinations  of expenditure  categories,  their
import  content  and the  question  of excesses  that  may  have  beer.  built
up from  past  patterns  of financing.
Government expenditures  in the past seem to have been especially  import-
intensive:  there  may also be a relationship  between this association  ard
certain types of government interventions  such as those of parastatals.
Changes in the composition  of expenditures,  and perhaps a  reduction of
government  interventions,  might  reduce  the import-GDP  ratio;  detailed  country
studies  of the  structure  of absorption  are  needed.
58.  The role  of the  exchange  rate and  import  reforms  in affecting  import
dependency  was  also  explored.  Certain  import reforms  (for example
substitution  of QRs by tariffs)  do not put an upward  pressure  on imports,
whereas  others  (reduction  of QRs for  instance)  do.  How  much of an effect  the
latter  would  have on imports  is obviously  an empirical  issue.  The empirica'
evidence suggests that an accompanying real devaluation n_r_se  has  a
significant  negative  effect  on imports.  The significance  of this estimated- 51  -
effect  varies substantially  among the countries  . The degree  of currency
overvaluation  is also vastly different;  based on one index of the real
exchange  rate,  considerable  depreciation  can be seen during  1984-80  in most
cases,  although  there  is  still  some  appreciation  compared  to the  1980  level  in
Tanzania and hardly any  change in Kenya and Nigeria  (Annex Table 5).
Devaluation  can  be an efficient  tool in affecting  imports  and  exports  to the
extent  that the domestic  currency  is overvalued  and there  are complementary
macroeconomic  Policies. Furthermore,  while  a real  devaluation  is seen  to  have
a  negative  effect  on imports,  the  impact  on the  import-GDP  ratio  also  depends
on what happens  to GDP and  exports  as a result. Policies  designed  to reduce
factor  market  distortions  are also likely  to reduce  import  demand.  Reforms
that address  artificially  low relative  prices  of capital  goods  and  high wage
rates  might  be effective  in reducing  import-growth  coefficient.
59.  Table 12 provides an overview of selected  areas of change  which
affect imports, and a description  of the expected effect on import-GDP
coefficients.  An acceleration  in the  overall  growth  in GDP is  usually  import
intensive.  In general,  countries  targeting  to grow at 4 percent p.a. as
opposed to the stagnation during the 1980s would need to factor in a
significant  increase  in the  import  coefficients.  The  severe  import
compression  of the 1980s  accentuate  the  need for  this  effect. Changes  in the
composition  of GDP, however, can also have significant  effects on import
demand.  The estimates  in this paper suggest  that a one percentage  point
increase  in agricultural  growth  holding  GDP growth  the  same  can  be associated
with a median deceleration  of import  growth  by 0.3 percentage  point.  The
range  for  this  potential  effect  is fairly  large,  ranging  from  a low effect  in
Zambia,  Kenya and Nigeria,  moderate  in C6te d'Ivoire  and Zaire, to  high in- 52  -
Madagascar,  Ghana  and  Tanzania. Increases  in industrial  share  of GDP as part
of a growth  process  would normally  raise the import  coefficients. However,
industrial restructuring and lowered protection from past situation of
inefficiency  and import  dependency  can  actually  lower  import-GDP  ratios. Such
prospects  for  lowering  the  import  dependency  are  particularly  strong  in  Ghana,
Tanzania  and Ethiopia,  and moderate  in Kenya;  the opposite  can also  be the
case  as in  Zimbabwe  where  the  need  exists  for  rehabilitation  of capital.
60.  The abovementioned  structural  changes could typically  affect  the
import coefficients  over a period  of time.  Macroeconomic  adjustments  are
likely  to have quicker  effects,  although  they  may be one-shot  in nature. An
important  effect  discussed  in this  paper  is an exchange  rate  depreciation  in
real  terms,  which  can  lower  import  demand,  depending  on the  degree  of currency
overvaluation. For the eight countries,  the median  effect  of a 10 percent
meal depreciation  is to lower  import  demand  by about 10 percent.  The scope
for this  effect  depends  both on the  degree  of currency  overvaluation  (high  in
Tanzania,  in contrast  to Zambia),  and  complementary  macroeconomic  policies  to
achieve  a real  depreciation.  Trade  liberalization  should  be expected  to raise
the import  share in GDP, especially  as import  restrictions  are lifted,  and
imports  needed  in  export  production  are  made  more  readily  available.
61.  Reducing  absorption  has  a significant  quantitative  effect  on reducing
import-GDP  ratios,  according  to  our  estimates. The  scope  for  reduction  in the
absorption-GDP  ratios,  however,  is mixed, as noted earlier.  Changing  the
composition  of absorption  may  be a more  potent  and  more feasible  in reducing
the pressure on imports.  The paper provided  estimates  on the effect  of
reducing  government  consumption  and reducing  imports,  which should  be viewed
more as illustrative  than  precise  quantitative  effects.  GIven  the suggested- 53  -
Table  12:  SUH4RY  OF LDKLY  EFFECrS  CN THE  DPOI?DGDP  RELATICN
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a/ The expected  effect  is  based  on estinettons  and  impressions for  the  eight  African  countries.- 54 -
direction  of a relatively  high import intensity  of government  consumption,
country  analysis  of public  expenditure  programs  would  be worthwhile. Factor
market  reforms are also hypothesized to reduce import-GDP  coefficients,
although  no quantitative  analysis  was possible  in this paper.  The overall
effect  of the abovementioned  factors  should  be aggregated  to assess  how much
of a departure  from long-term  trends  of import  elasticities  of greater  than
one  might  be expected  on account  of structural  and  policy  changes.
62.  As noted  at the  outset,  however,  the  discussion  has  not covered  some
potentially  important  areas.  First,  how much of the import-GDP  picture  in
Africa is adequately  captured  by  the variables  considered  thus far and by
available  data?  We are  examining  the  effects  of population,  urbanization  and
foreign  aid. in addition  to the structural  and policy  variables  employed  in
this paper.  Second,  data  problems  deserve  special  attention. Smuggling  and
border trade are particularly  important  for import  estimates,  and informal
sector  and subsistence  agriculture  activities  for  output  measures. One might
also seek to throw  light  oti  how the reporting  of imports  depends  on economic
management: overvaluation  of the  currency,  transport  availability,  recording
capacity;  as well as political  factors. Overvaluation  of the local  currency
and devaluation  also  present  biases  in the level  and changes  in the  imports-
GDP ratio,  although  the  national  accounts  data used here may have minimized
this problem.  Third,  the import  requirements  of growth  merit much greater
disaggregation  in the  Africa  context.  For instance,  at least  food  and non-
food  elasticities  should  be separated  in the  analysis. While  some  of this  can
be done through  the data  being compiled  by the IEC department,  much greater
country/content  in the discussion  of growth  bottlenecks  relating  to imports
would  be useful.- 55 -
63.  Fourth,  at a more general  level,  the interrelations  among exports,
foreign  aid, foreign  exchange  constraints  and import  restrictions  is crucial.
Recent work has begun to examine the important role of foreign exchange
availability and QRs  in import-CDP  determination,  and this line of work
deserves  to be pursued  further. More empirical  work on the effect  of import
policy  on th.e  export  response  would  also  be valuable. Fifth,  the  relationship
among  trade  reforms,  parallel  markets,  import  intensity  and  income
distribution  are important.  With LSMS data coming on stream in several
African  countries,  these  aspects  deserve  special  attention  given  the  emphasis
on trade reform and the significant  size of parallel markets in several
countries. Finally,  a special  effort  to relate  public  investment  programs  to
imports  would  be worthwhile.  High  elasticities  in  some  periods  can  be related
to particular  projects.  Changing  sectoral  emphasis  in proposed  investment
programs  can  be an important  source  of information  on increases  or decreases
in import  demand  in  the  future.- 56  -
Annex
Figure  1:
IMPORT  YOLUME  AND  REAL  IMPORT  SHARE  IN DEVELOPING  COUNTRiES
(includes  goods  &  non-4actor  services)
50  /
30
25  'realI  impfgJp  Q  7)
20  ............  **  ...  .
15f
v  *1  '  I  I 
a 4  70  72  741 76 F78  80  84  2  s  3
Source:  BESD,  IORD.- 57  -
ANNEX
Figure  2:
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Source:  Region's  estimates,  World  Bank  data.Table  1:  6DP  6RQNTH  ANlD  INPORI  6RONTH
i065-73  1974-S1  1912-116  1945-91  1965-9
60P  loport  lap/6IP  GWP Import lmp/S6P  6SP Import lbp/S6P  6NP  Import lop/SIP  6SP lpart  lap/6DP
LC  6.3  7.0  1.1  4.5  7.0  1.4  2.9  -1.4  -0.5  5.4  7.0  1.3  4.3  4.9  1.0
Africa  5.2  6.5  1.3  2.8  6.6  2.4  0.1  -4.4  -9.1  4.0  6.5  1.6  3.2  3.3  1.0
Africa  lexci  Nigeria)  4.5  5.2  1.2  3.2  3.6  1.1  2.2  -0.S  -0.4  3.3  4.3  1.1  3.5  3.0  0.9
Asia  5.1  6.3  1.4  5.7  9.0  1.6  4.7  5.6  0.6  5.6  6.7  1.5  6.0  7.9  1.3
Europe  6.2  4.9  0.6  3.9  -0.6  -0.2  2.7  1.0  0.7  5.0  2.0  0.4  4.5  1.9  0.4
laddle  East  9.3  10.5  1.1  3.4  14.5  4.0  0.1  -7.3  -73.0  *.5  12.4  1.9  5.0  7.1  1.5
Latin  America  4.2  6.6  1.1  4.7  6.4  1.4  1.5  -4.4  -4.9  5.4  4.6  1.2  4.5  3.1  0.1
Sub-Saharan  Africa  5.4  5.7  1.0  1.6  7.7  4.1  -0.2  -7.1  35.5  3.4  4.6  1.9  2.7  3.3  1.2
SSA  lescd  Nigerial  4.4  4.9  1.1  2.4  2.6  1.0  1.9  -1.5  -0.3  3.5  3.4  1.0  3.1  2.4  0.8
Low  Income  Cos  5.1  3.7  0.7  4.6  6.1  1.3  7.2  7.7  1.1  5.0  4.9  1.0  5.5  5.6  1.0
High  Indebted  Cos  6.3  7.1  1.1  4.4  6.1  1.6  1.1  -9.1  -0.3  5.4  7.6  1.4  4.3  3.4  0.8  00
35  SAL  Cos-
IS Naor SAL  Cos  - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - -
I  African  Cos  - - - - - - - - - - *  - - -
Ikoo flea:
Cote  d'  lvoire  5.4  - - 5.3  2.7  0.5  -0.6  -2.3  3.3  5.5  - - 4.1  -
Ghana  4.0  - - -1.1  6.2. -5.6  1.5  1.9  1.3  1.4  - - 1.6  - -
Kenya  .9  - - 4.7  -1.9  -0.4  3.0  -1.7  -0.4  5.?  - - 5.2  - -
Nadaganar  2.1  - - 0.0  - - 0.3  -4.0  -7.5  1.1  - - 1.0  - -
Nigeria  7.7  - - 0.1  - - -3.2  -19.5  6.1  4.1  - - 2.5  - -
Tanzania  55  - - 4.6  -0.2  -0.0  1.4  -1.5  -1.1  5.1  - - 4.2  -
laie  4.3  - - -0.9  -8.5  10.4  1.2  -3.2  -2.7  2.9  - - 2.5  -
laabia  .r  - - 1.4  -3.1  -2.2  -0.6  -11.0  10.3  4.5  - - 3.4  -
Source:  Morld  Econoit  Outlook,  IMf.- 59  -
Table  2:  IMPORT  SHARES  OF GDP (INCLUDE  GOODS  AND  NON-FACTOR  SERVICES)
(in  %)
1965-73  1974-81  1982-86  1965-81  1965-86
LDC 1/  14.4  20.1  21.1  17.1  18.0
Africa  jI  22.9  26.9  23.7  24.8  24.6
Africa  (exel.  Nigeria)  i/  24.0  28.2  27.2  26.0  26.2
Asia  13.1  21.5  26.5  17.1  19.2
*EKENA  22.0  29.7  31.1  25.6  26.9
Latin  America  12.1  15.0  13.1  13.5  13.4
Sub-Saharan  Africa  22.5  26.7  23.0  24.5  24.1
Sub-Saharan  Africa  (excl.
Nigeria)  24.2  28.7  28.8  26.4  26.9
Low  Income  Countries  2/  7.5  10.8  13.0  9.0  9.9
High Indebted  Countries  i/  12.8  16.6  14.2  14.6  14.5
35 SAL  Countries  _/  13.8  18.1  18.2  15.9  16.4
15  Major  SAL  Countries  j/  15.0  20.3  22.0  17.5  18.5
8  African  Countries  i/  21.8  25.6  19.1  23.6  22.6
Memo item:
C6te  d'Ivoire  29.2  38.3  34.6  33.4  33.7
Ghana  j/  20.2  12.9  7.9  16.8  15.1
Kenya  30.2  35.6  27.9  32.7  31.6
Madagascar  23.4  25.7  19.9  24.5  23.5
Nigeria  17.4  23.8  15.9  20.4  19.4
Tanzania  27.7  27.4  16.6  27.6  25.1
Zaire  16.5  20.0  31.2  18.2  21.1
Zambia  38.3  42.1  36.8  40.1  39.4
Definition
1.  Based  on WDR  90 countries.
2.  Based  on WDR  30 low income  countries
3.  Based  on WDR  17  high debt  countries
4.  Based  on the  World  Bank's  structural  adjustment  lending  countries.
5.  Chile,  Colombia,  C6te d'Ivoire,  Jamaica,  Kenya,  Korea,  Malawi,  Mauritius,
Mexico,  Morocco,  Panama,  Philippines,  Senegal,  Thailand,  and  Turkey.
6.  Data is  up to 1985  only.
Source: BESD*  60 -
AME
Table  3:  IMPLICIT  EXPORT  TAXES FOR SELECTED  AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITIES  &f
Tobacco  Cocoa  CoffeQ  Tea
1963  1984  1985  193  1984  1985  1083  1084  1985  1963  1984  1965
Z_bia  27.3  - - - - - - - - -
Tmia  53.1  52.5  37.1  - - - 23.1  31.3  27.5  - - -
'tNgeria  - - 4.2  14.9  16.4  - - - -
.mya  - - - - - - -7.02  2.7  8.00  -69.4  -22.4  -
C te d'ivoLre  81.3  $2.6  82.9  56.2  61.0  56.2  68.8  69.7  67.9  - - -
Gabna  - - - -187.0  64.4  52.5  - - - - - -
A/  Defined  as:
- 1  1  - px  ]  . 100
This  assumes  away  binding  export  quotas. If there  were indeed  binding  export
quotas,  then our calculations  would capture  the price differential  arising
from  the  export  tax  proper  plus the  price  differential  resulting  from  export
quotas.
where
tx  :  Implicit  export  tax  rate.
px  : Domestic  prices.  These were proxied  by official  producers"  prices
'(World  Bank),  adjusted  for  transportation  and  other  costs  by using  the
IFS  CIF/FOB  conversion  factors.
px* :  World  prices  for the  ith  commodity. These  were  proxied  by IFS  London
or  New  York  commodity  prices.
E  :  Dollar  prices  were converted  to home currency  units  by using  the IFS
nominal  official  exchange  rate  (line  rf). Converting  dollar  prices  to
local currency by means  of "black market" exchange rate would
substantially  increase  our  estimates  of implicit  export  taxes.- 61 -
ANN 3
Table  4:  ABSORPTION  TO GDP  RATIOS  IN  AFRICAN  COUNTRIES
(1970-85)
C6te
d'Ivoire Ghana  Kenya Madagascar Nigeria Tanzania Zaire Zambia
1970  93.3  101.4 100.8  101.1  100.2  102.0  91.9  83.2
1971  96.2  104.5  106.5  106.1  99.3  104.7  97.0  102.1
1972  95.5  94.5 102.1  103.3  97.1  103.6  98.8  98.4
1973  97.5  94.9 101.3  104.0  94.1  106.1  95.5  84.2
1974  92.7  103.5  107.2  103.9  81.1  114.6  94.6  90.5
1975  99.9  99.1  104.7  104.3  112.4  109.8  102.0  119.5
1976  94.5  100.3  99.3  101.4  99.3  102.2  100.9  94.9
1977  93.7  101.1  96.6  102.6  100.6  103.3  105.6  102.6
1978  100.9  101.3 109.8  106.2  104.1  115.1  99.2  103.4
1979  103.1  99.9 106.0  116.3  93.7  112.7  98.7  91.0
1980  106.2  100.7 111.4  117.1  93.5  113.2  101.2  104.0
1981  107.2  100.6 109.0  111.6  106.6  108.5  105.6  112.5
1982  102.9  99.6 104.6  109.5  107.2  110.5  104.2  108.8
1983  98.8  103.2 101.1  106.8  103.7  108.1  102.2  101.1
1984  88.9  100.3 102.4  104.4  98.2  108.9  97.4  96.2
1985  86.8  101.8 102.4  105.3  92.2  110.0  97.7  97.7
Source: BESD  System,  World  Bank.- 62 -
ANNEX
Table  5:  REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE  RATE INDICES,  1980-100
(TRADE  WEIGHT  AT 1980)
Cote
dl'voire Ghana  Kenya Nadagascar Nigeria Tanzania Zaire  Zambia
1965  150.01 254.24  98.15  201.02
1966  146.27 232.68  97.72  176.66
1967  142.39 295.37  96.62  202.82
1968  134.35 327.22  95.24  224.61  115.34  252.44  64.31
1969  139.52 316.36  100.08  210.52  102.10  245.95  64.72
1970  141.09 327.92  107.08  194.87  105.27  241.19  66.20
1971  145.25 318.31  105.46  171.77  104.86  235.69  67.33
1972  148.74 408.91  102.59  169.22  107.84  229.39  70.39
1973  145.82 357.98  106.85  191.04  113.49  248.75  73.61
1974  159.97 354.22 100.64 113.11  191.94  114.82  185.09  91.90
1975  142.57 322.65  96.24  101.07  158.66  105.89  155.04  91.09
1976  140.58 211.86  99.49  106.74  133.97  112.42  131.54  84.69
1977  121.87 109.18  94.50  113.77  123.44  111.06  97.23  86.31
1978  112.70  99.01  86.58  113.04  113.18  107.77  72.14  85.98
1979  106.43 134.14  92.88  108.29  110.24  116.07  80.83  91.75
1980  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 100.00
1981  106.73  44.40  104.75  89.81  89.27  75.40  97.07  94.96
1982  114.23  35.05  102.06  82.39  88.22  61.39  91.28  85.65
1983  120.86  19.36 104.89  82.69  74.89  55.48  67.64  92.93
1984  127.85 141.45  98.64  97.98  55.35  53.05  191.25 105.99
1985  129.08 193.81  98.85  103.02  61.20  46.37  208.77 113.44
1986  115.35 287.71  98.50  111.55  100.94  65.12  208.33 220.73
Note:  Real effective  exchange  rate indices  are calculated  as trade  weighted
geometric  average  of the  bilateral  exchange  rates  adjusted  by the  ratio
of domestic  consumer  price index to the corresponding  trade partner
wholesale  price  index.- 63 -
ANNEX
Data  Definitions  and  Sources
Real Merchandise Imports:  Nominal dollar merchandise  imports
deflated by  a  country-specific dollar import price  index (1980-1).
Merchandise  imports  are taken from the ANDREX tapes (IECSE/World  Bank),
line "CP, IMP, TOTAL".  This series follows very closely merchandise
imports  (SITC's  0-9)  as reported  by UNCTAD. However,  as the  latter  series
covers  up to 1983 only, we used the IECSE  series  instead. The country-
specific  dollar  import  price indices  are from  the  ANDREX  tapes,  line "PT,
IMP,  TOTAL". These  price  indices  are  weighted  averages  of sub-indices  "or
five import  categories: manufactures,  food,  non-food  agriculture,  metals
and  minerals,  and fuels.  These  categories  were defined  according  to one-
digit,  two-digits  and three-digits  SITC's  codes.  For the specifics,  see
Moran  and  Park (1986).
Ratio  of  Intermediate Imoorts to GDP. at Constant Prices:
Intermediate,  capital  and  fuel  constant  dollar  imports  relative  to constant
dollar GDP.  Intermediate,  capital  and fuel current dollar imports  are
taken from UNCTAD's COMTRADE  tapes,  Accessed  through the TARS software
(World  Bank).  These aggregates  are made up as follows.  Intermediates  -
SITC's  2  (crude  materials,  excluding  fuels)  +  5 (chemicals)  +  6  (basic
manufactures). Capital  goods  - SITC  7 (machines  and transport  equipment).
Fuel  - SITC 3 (mineral  fuels). These  import  aggregates  do not correspond
to those available  in ANDREX,  which follow  the categories  employed  for
constructing  the import  price sub-indices.  For this reason, we used
UNCTAD's import  data instead.  Current  dollar  intermediate  imports  were
converted to constant terms by deflating through the country-specific
dollar  import  price index  (1980-1). Although  IECSE  has produced  separate
indices  for  fuel  and  manufactured  imports,  we could  not construct  an index
for intermediate  imports  on the basis of these two, since manufactures
includes intermediates  proper and capital goods, as well as non-food
eonstumer  goods.  This  last category cannot  be disentan.Pled  fro= -- ther
manufactures.  Hence,  since  we did  not  have  a specific  intermediate  import
price index at hand, we settled for the overall  one.  Constant (1980)
dollar  GDP is taken  from  ANDREX,  line  "KP.$.GDP.MP".  We should  note that
this series  uses the "atlas"  exchange  rate to convert  local  currency  GDP
data to dollar  GDP data.  The "atlas"  exchange  rate  proxies  for  the rate
actually applied in transactions and thus seeks to eliminate biases
associated  with overvaluation.  For a  description  of the methodology
employed  for  computing  the "atlas"  exchange  rate,  see the technical  nctes
in  a World  Development  Report.
Real Income: Nominal  home-currency  GDP deflated  by the implicit
home-currency  GDP deflator  (1980-1). Both  series  are  from  the  BESD tapes,
(IECSE/World  Bank).- 64 -
Absorotion  to GDP:  Nominal  home-currency  absorption  relative  to
nominal home-currency  GDP.  Absorption  is equal to the sum of priva.-e
consumption,  public  consumption,  and  investment,  and  is taken  from  BESD.
Real  Absorotion:  Nominal  home-currency  absorption  deflated  by the
nominal-home  currency  GDP  deflator  (1980s).
Real Exchange  Rate: Nominal  exchange  rate  index  (1980-1)  deflated
by the implicit  GDP deflator (1980-1). The Nominal  exchange  rate is a
bilateral  rate  which  indicates  the  number  of domestic  currency  units  traded
per  US dollar. It is  taken  from  BESD  and  is  the  same  as the  period-average
exchange  rate  in IFS  (line'rf).
Real Effective  Exchangi  Rate:  Nominal effective  exchange  rate
index (1980-1) deflated by the CPI (1980-1).  The nominal effective
exchange  rate indices  use 1980  tradle  weights  derived  from  the  Direction  of
Trade  Statistics  Yearbook. These  indices  were calculated  by CECTP  (World
Bank). The  CPI's  are  from  BESD (same  as line  64 in IVS).
Im2ort  Price  Index:  Country-specific  dollar import price
(1980-1). See  description  for  real  merchandise  imports.
Ratio of  f Goods and Services  to Net Debt:  Nominal
dollar  exports  of.  goods  and services  relative  to nom!nal  dollar  net debt.
Exports  of goods  and services  ars taken  from  ANDREX,  line "CR,  EXP, GS".
Net debt is defined as the stock of debt exclusive foreign exchange
reserves. The stock  of debt  is  taken  from  BESD,  and it  refers  to  long-term
public  and  publicy-guaranteed  disbursed  outstanding  debt.  Foreign  exchange
reserves, including gold holdings, are taken from the IFS tapes (line
l..D).
Real Exports  of Goods and Services:  Nominal  dollar  exports  of
goods  and  services  deflated  by a country-specific  dollar  import  price  index
(1980-1).
- Real Net Debt:  Nominal  dollar  net debt deflated  by  - country-
specific  dollar  import  price  deflator  (1980-1).
Investment Share  in GDP:  Nominal home-currency investment
relative  to nominal  home-currency  GDP.  Investment  here incorporate  fixed
investment  as  well as changes  in stocks. Both  investment  and  GDP are  from
BESD.
Agricultural  Share  in  GDP: Nominal  home-currency  agricultural  GDP
relative  to  nominal  home-currency  aggregate  GDP.  This  series  was  converted
to a three-year  moving  average,  centered  on the  middle  observation. For
C6te d'Ivoire,  Kenya,  Nigeria  and  Tanzania,  agricultural  GDP and  aggregate
GDP  are  at  factor  cost  ("basic prices").  Conversely, for Ghana,
Madagascar,  Zaire  and Zambia,  agricultural  GDP and aggregate  GDP are  both
at  market  prices  ("producer  prices"). All  of these  data  are from  BESD.- 65 -
Po2ulation:  Million  inhabitants,  taken  from  BESD.  This  series
was converted  also to a three-year  moving  average,  centered  on the  middle
observation.- 66 -
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